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“LEAVE ME MY NAME!”: WHY 
COMPETITIVE KEYWORD ADVERTISING IS 
AN ETHICAL LANDMINE FOR ATTORNEYS 
SKYLAR REESE CROY* 
Search engine providers, like Google and Yahoo!, make money by allowing 
advertisers to bid on keywords.  When a user enters the keyword, the 
advertisement is prominently displayed, typically toward the top of the results.  
States are divided on whether to allow attorneys to bid on the names of 
other attorneys—a practice known as competitive keyword advertising.  On one 
hand, just this summer, a New Jersey ethics panel took the position that 
competitive keyword advertising does not, generally, violate of the rules of 
professional conduct.  However, the advertisement may not include text with 
the searched-for attorney’s name that is hyperlinked to the advertising 
attorney’s website.  Similarly, the Florida Bar Board of Governors recently 
passed a limited form of regulation, which awaits the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s approval before taking effect.  Texas has held competitive keyword 
advertising is ethical as long as a reasonable person would not believe the 
advertising attorney is associated with the searched-for attorney.  Kentucky has 
not taken a stance per se but it did not discipline a lawyer for participating.  On 
the other hand, South and North Carolina have disciplined attorneys for 
bidding on another attorney’s name. 
Those in favor of allowing attorneys to bid on other attorneys’ names have 
argued that a prohibition would effectively create a new intellectual property 
right in attorney names.  They argue competitive keyword advertising does not 
violate trademark law or publicity rights. 
This Article argues in favor of regulation.  It shows the debate is more 
complicated than the scholarly literature currently acknowledges and, in 
 
* J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School; Law Clerk to the Honorable Patience Drake 
Roggensack, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  The author thanks Professor BJ Ard, who 
teaches intellectual property at the University of Wisconsin Law School, for thoughtful feedback.  The 
author also thanks Timothy Pierce, the Ethics Counsel for the Wisconsin State Bar and an adjunct 
professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, for helpful insight and advice.  The author thanks 
Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel for the Florida Bar, for speaking with him about the issues 
discussed in this Article, and specifically for insightful comments regarding In re Naert.  A draft of 
this Article was sent to the Florida Bar’s Ethics Counsel on April 13, 2019, for consideration in the 
Florida Bar Board of Governors’ May 2019 vote, discussed infra. 
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particular, questions the way in which intellectual property has been used as a 
framework. 
First, a violation of a disciplinary rule does not depend upon a violation of 
civil law.  Neither a violation of trademark law nor publicity rights is necessary 
for the imposition of discipline. 
Second, search engine providers, and their customers that purchase 
keywords, have a pecuniary interest in making keyword advertisements look 
like organic results: Consumers trust organic results more.  Indeed, substantial 
empirical evidence, in numerous studies, demonstrates consumers struggle to 
identify which results of a search are advertisements.  This kind of confusion 
should be of concern to regulators because it suggests all keyword advertising 
(even keyword advertising that does not involve the purchase of another 
attorney’s name) is manipulative and inherently misleading.  Trademark law is 
not concerned with this kind of confusion:  It merely cares about whether 
consumers are confused as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. 
Third, some evidence suggests consumers are confused in the trademark 
sense: At least when the advertisement uses the searched-for attorney’s name, 
some clients have actually hired attorneys thinking they were someone else.  
Even more have probably clicked on a link for one attorney only to realize it 
was someone else, unaffiliated with the attorney they searched for.  This causes 
frustration and distrust of the legal profession.  Furthermore, competitive 
keyword advertising is a dishonorable attempt by attorneys to piggyback on the 
reputation of another attorney, implicating the attorney’s oath.  Competitive 
keyword advertising is thus worse than non-competitive keyword advertising. 
Fourth, the proposition that attorney participation does not violate 
publicity rights stems from a single case—Habush v. Cannon.  This was a case 
decided by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals—an intermediate appellate court—
and the court stated the decision was “a close one.”  Furthermore, the case’s 
reasoning had little to do with consumer confusion, making it of little value for 
regulators given that they are primarily concerned with protecting the public. 
In summary, regulation is justified. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
High school English teachers across the country assign their students The 
Crucible.  In this 1953 play, Mary Warren, John Proctor’s servant, accuses Mr. 
Proctor of witchcraft during the infamous Salem Witch Trials.  Mr. Proctor, 
under duress, verbally confesses.  However, when the judge asks him to sign a 
confession, he becomes distressed and refuses.  He exclaims: “Because it is my 
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name!  Because I cannot have another in my life! . . .  I have given you my soul; 
leave me my name!”1 
In early 2018, Alex Hanna, a Florida attorney, had a similar concern about 
his name.  He alleged that other Florida attorneys had purchased his name as a 
keyword from search engine providers, such that when a user searched his 
name, the advertisements from the other attorneys appeared2—a practice 
known as competitive keyword advertising.3  Moreover, Mr. Hanna alleged that 
users hired the advertising attorneys under the false impression that they had 
some connection to Mr. Hanna.4  Mr. Hanna’s attorney wrote in a letter to the 
Florida bar that: 
When the Advertising Lawyers did not handle the cases to the 
clients’ satisfaction, the clients threatened to file bar 
complaints against the Hanna Firm.  Imagine Mr. Hanna’s 
surprise when he received these threats—because Mr. Hanna 
did not even know the clients, and was not representing them!  
Such complaints not only could cost the Hanna Firm time and 
money, but—even more importantly—the clients are likely to 
have diminished confidence in the legal system after being 
duped into hiring a law firm they did not search for and did not 
knowingly hire.5 
“The Ticket Clinic” had purchased Mr. Hanna’s name given his reputation 
as a traffic ticket specialist.6  A search for “Alex Hanna” led to a results page 
with an advertisement stating, “Alex Hanna from $49 – Solution for Traffic, 
DUI and Speeding Tickets,” and immediately below was a link, 
“www.theticketclinic.com,” and a “phone number 877 – CITATION.”7  Figure 
1 shows the advertisement. 
 
1. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 133 (Penguin Books 1995) (emphasis added). 
2. Letter from Timothy P. Chinaris, Att’y for Alex Hanna, to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics 
Counsel, Fla. Bar 2 (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/03/CAC-
Meeting-Materials-March-20-2018-Teleconference-108-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYE4-S7VG]. 
3. See generally Eric Goldman & Angel Reyes III, Regulation of Lawyers’ Use of Competitive 
Keyword Advertising, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 103; Teresa Shaw, Should Your Firm Engage in 
Competitive Keyword Advertising?, AGILELAW (last visited Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.agilelaw.com/blog/should-your-firm-engage-in-competitive-keyword-advertising/ 
[https://perma.cc/4XW7-CYBN] (“Competitive keyword advertising (CKA) is when you use the name 
of your competitor for your own PPC [pay-per-click] ads so your firm is displayed whenever users 
search for your competition.”). 
4. Letter from Timothy P. Chinaris to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, supra note 2, at 2. 
5. Id. 
6. See Letter from Richard J. Ovelmen, Att’y for Alex Hanna, to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics 
Counsel, Fla. Bar, Exhibit A (Sept. 21, 2018) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
7. Memorandum from Precise Protective Research, Inc. to Client 1 (Oct. 22, 2015) (on file with 
the Marquette Law Review). 
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Figure 1: The Advertisement Mr. Hanna Complained About8 
 
 
An investigation revealed multiple confused clients: 
Client Alain Dominguez was under the impression that he had 
retained Alex Hanna’s Law Firm and only realized he was 
being represented by the Ticket Clinic when he called Alex 
Hanna’s Law Firm to check on the status of his case. . . .  Bryan 
Rodriguez who had also suffered a similar confusion . . . found 
 
8. Presentation to BRC: Rule Banning Use of Other Lawyers’ Names as Search Terms 2 (May 
2018) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
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out that he had hired The Ticket Clinic when he called the 
offices of Alex Hanna.  In reviewing court records the attorney 
of record is Ted Hollander for both [the] Mr. Dominguez and 
Rodriguez cases.9 
Three more clients expressed similar confusion.10  The report suggested the 
confusion is particularly problematic for one set of vulnerable clients: those 
“not proficient in the English language.”11 
The Florida Bar’s record also contains another screenshot, which shows a 
competitive keyword advertisement that does not directly use another 
attorney’s name, shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Morgan & Morgan Screenshot from the Florida Bar’s Record12 
The second result, “Injury & Accident Lawyers,” is a competitive keyword 
advertisement.  Had someone not purchased the right to display the 
advertisement so prominently, it would not be the second result.  Despite not 
 
9. Memorandum from Precise Protective Research, Inc. to Client, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
10. Id. at 2 (“[The investigator] also contacted Karla Hufford, Jakhia R. Lawrence and Orlando 
Paz, these clients expressed that they were confused by the add [sic] . . . .”). 
11. Id. 
12. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, FLA. BAR, AGENDA ITEM SUMMARY Item No. 20c, 
Exhibit A (Mar. 2018), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/03/CAC-Meeting-Materials-
March-20-2018-Teleconference-108-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUD4-ZD5X]. 
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using the name of another attorney, some confusion still comes from the 
advertisement being sandwiched between two results that say “Morgan & 
Morgan” and not having any responsible attorney designated in the 
advertisement. 
Florida went on to allow competitive keyword advertising by a narrow 4–5 
vote in mid-2018.13  Notably, Florida had considered and rejected a ban in 
2013.14  In May of 2019, however, the Florida Bar Board of Governors passed 
a limited version of regulation, which awaits approval from the Supreme Court 
of Florida.15  This limited regulation requires the keyword advertisement 
“clearly indicate” who it is advertising for, so that situations like Mr. Hanna’s 
do not arise again.16 
Other states have taken similar stances—but some have outright banned 
competitive keyword advertising.  On one hand, just this past summer, a New 
Jersey ethics panel held competitive keyword advertising is generally allowed, 
but doing what the Traffic Clinic did is misconduct.17  Texas took a similar 
stance in 2016, noting competitive keyword advertising would be unethical if a 
reasonable person might believe the advertising attorney was associated with 
the searched-for attorney.18  Texas assumed that competitive keyword 
advertising would not create a false impression of association if the 
advertisement merely included the advertising attorney’s name and a link.19  
Kentucky has not taken a stance per se, but it did not discipline an attorney who 
bid on another’s name.20  On the other hand, South and North Carolina have not 
allowed the practice.21 
 
13. Jim Ash, Proposal to Address Internet Advertising Tactic off the Table, FLA. B. (June 15, 
2018), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/proposal-to-address-internet-advertising-
tactic-off-the-table/ [https://perma.cc/EJJ7-4KXN].   
14. Id. 
15. See infra Section II.H. 
16. See infra Section II.H. 
17. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Appointed by the Supreme Court of N.J., ACPE Op. 735 
(2019), https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2019/n190806c.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4J6-U764].   




20. Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 20, Habush v. Cannon, 2013 WI App 34, 346 Wis. 2d 
709, 828 N.W.2d 876 (No. 2011AP001769) (on file with the Marquette Law Review).   
21. In re Naert, 777 S.E.2d 823 (S.C. 2015) (per curiam); Grievance Comm. of the N.C. State 
Bar, In re Turlington, Op. 13G0121 (2013), 
http://www.ncbar.com/orders/turlington,%20iii%20david%2013g0121.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5Y-
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The division among states reflects the division among attorneys on this 
topic.  On one hand, Will Hornsby, an attorney in the American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) Division of Legal Services, who “has been described 
as ‘the king of legal ethics and lawyer marketing on the Internet,’” defended 
the practice.22  Additionally, Professor Eric Goldman, a prominent law and 
technology scholar, has essentially called supporters of regulation stupid.23  On 
the other hand, Professor David L. Hudson, Jr. described attorney participation 
in competitive keyword advertising as a “seedy world.”24  Monroe Freedman, 
a “nationally known authority on lawyer ethics . . . likened it to putting one’s 
name on another lawyer’s door and labeled it as ‘wrong.’”25  Thomas Basting, 
the former President of the Wisconsin State Bar, also denounced the practice.26  
In summary, the issue has a tendency to raise attorneys’ blood pressure, 
regardless of which side they fall on. 
Those in favor of allowing attorneys to participate in competitive keyword 
advertising improperly rely on, and to some extent incorrectly apply, 
intellectual property theories.  Many times, they expressly rely on trademark 
law and publicity rights to support their positions.  For example, three law 
professors and a law student wrote to the Florida Bar when it considered a ban 
in 2013 arguing,  
[C]ourts consistently have held that competitive keyword 
advertising does not violate intellectual property rights.  With 
respect to trademarks, a super-majority of cases reaching a 
final disposition on the trademark issues have rejected liability, 
including all three jury trials.  With respect to publicity rights, 
 
TDY]; N.C. State Bar, 2010 Formal Ethics Op. 14 (2012), https://www.ncbar.gov/for-
lawyers/ethics/adopted-opinions/2010-formal-ethics-opinion-14/ [https://perma.cc/CPC4-RNFM]. 
22. Brief of Defendants-Respondents, supra note 20, at 20–21.   
23. Eric Goldman, The Florida Bar and Competitive Keyword Advertising: A Tragicomedy (in 
3 Parts), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/08/the-florida-bar-and-competitive-keyword-advertising-
a-tragicomedy-in-3-parts.htm [https://perma.cc/DW9B-QJET] (“In 2013, the Florida Bar considered a 
proposal to ban competitive keyword advertising by lawyers. . . .  [H]ere we are in 2018, and the issue 
has risen from the dead. . . .  I submitted a short letter to the Florida Bar explaining why this topic 
remains stupid.”).  Notably, Professor Goldman felt it necessary to poke fun at supporters of bar 
regulation with a grumpy cat meme stating, “EVEN GRUMPY CAT LOVES SEARCH 
ADVERTISING.”  Id. 
24. David L. Hudson, Jr., Attorney Advertising in The Litigators and Modern-Day America: The 
Continued Importance of the Public’s Need for Legal Information, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 959, 965 
(2018). 
25. Combined Reply Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, app. at 
52–54, Habush, 2013 WI App 34 (No. 2011AP001769). 
26. Id. at 10, app. at 89–91. 
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the Wisconsin Appeals Court recently held that purchasing 
another lawyer’s name as a keyword trigger did not violate 
Wisconsin’s publicity rights.  In light of these rulings, the 
Proposal effectively would create a new, dangerous and 
unnecessary intellectual property right.27 
Indeed, when Google weighed in on the issue in 2013, it was through its 
Director of Trademarks, Terri Chen, who analogized to trademark rationales to 
argue that competitive keyword advertising does not mislead consumers.28  
Somewhat ironically, proponents of regulation argue the opposite: that 
competitive keyword advertising violates trademark law.29  A staff analysis of 
the Florida Bar noted, “The proponent’s reliance on trademark . . . laws are 
misplaced” because a violation of trademark law is not necessary for 
discipline.30  However, both trademark law and attorney advertising regulations 
are concerned with protecting the public.  Therefore, analogies to trademark 
law cannot be completely dismissed merely because a violation of trademark 
law is not an independent ground for discipline.  Arguments grounded in 
trademark law are problematic, however, for a more fundamental reason: 
Trademark law has a narrow focus. 
Confusion in the context of trademark law, generally, refers to confusion 
about source, sponsorship, or affiliation.31  A consumer that clicked on an 
 
27. Letter from Faye E. Jones, Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Eric Goldman, & Jake McGowan, to Elizabeth 
Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Fla. Bar 2 (Apr. 29, 2013) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), 
https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/03/CAC-Meeting-Materials-March-20-2018-
Teleconference-108-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/22SY-8HMZ]. 
28. Letter from Terri Chen, Dir. of Trademarks, Google, to Eugene Keith Pettis, Att’y (Dec. 2, 
2013), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/03/CAC-Meeting-Materials-March-20-2018-
Teleconference-108-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY3G-34MM].  Ms. Chen’s argument was that 
competitive keyword advertising is not misleading.  Id.  While she did not expressly reference 
trademark law, her understanding of what is misleading clearly follows trademark rationales.  Id. at 2 
(“When one searches on a search engine for the term ‘BMW,’ one receives a list of web search results 
accompanied by a number of advertisements . . . .  Many of those ads may be for BMW dealerships; 
others may be for BMW’s competitors, like Audi or Mercedes-Benz.  These ads do not lead anyone to 
believe that BMW is affiliated with Audi or Mercedes-Benz.”). 
29. E.g., Letter from Richard J. Ovelmen to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, supra note 6 (“The majority 
of courts that have addressed whether the use of a competitor’s name for purposes of online advertising 
(whether through keywords, metatags, etc.) constitutes a trademark ‘use’ have held that it does either 
expressly or by implication . . . .  Likewise, many courts that have addressed the issue of consumer 
confusion in this context have held that such a use is, indeed, likely to cause confusion.”) (citations 
omitted). 
30. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12.   
31. E.g., David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much 
Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 497–98 (2013) (“To establish liability, the 
plaintiff must show the defendant’s use of a trademark leads to confusion as to source (i.e., some 
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attorney’s competitive keyword advertisement thinking the advertisement was 
for a different attorney, for example, would be a concern of trademark law.  
Studies vary, but generally suggest this kind of confusion is minimal for 
competitive keyword advertising.32  The above example of Mr. Hanna is merely 
anecdotal, and Mr. Hanna’s example is an extreme case given that the 
advertisement actually used his name.  However, consumers are confused in 
other ways.  For example, a 2013 article published in the Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology found that twenty-seven percent of consumers did not know 
search providers were paid to run advertisements.33  A 2012 study found that 
between thirty-seven percent and fifty-five percent of internet searchers could 
not identify the multiple advertisements contained within a single search.34  
Competitive keyword advertising is purposefully manipulative and 
misleading.  Consumers trust natural search results significantly more.  One 
poll asked consumers, “If you knew/know exactly which . . . [search results] 
are sponsored, would/do you treat them with more caution, having more 
confidence in the organic search results?”35  Over one-third said definitely, and 
an additional thirty-seven percent said probably.36  Almost an additional fifth 
said maybe.37  A mere 8.3 percent said no or probably no.38  In summary, search 
engine providers have an interest in confusing consumers into clicking on 
keyword advertisements.39 
 
consumers think the defendant’s goods actually are those of the plaintiff), sponsorship (i.e., that 
plaintiff has endorsed the defendant’s goods), or affiliation (i.e., that the plaintiff and defendant are 
legally related entities).”). 
32. Id. at 536 (“To summarize, we find little evidence of confusion in the traditional sense, but 
there is plenty of uncertainty about other matters.”). 
33. Id. at 513. 
34. Ronald C. Goodstein, Gary J. Bamossy, Basil G. Englis, & Howard S. Hogan, Using 
Trademarks as Keywords: Empirical Evidence of Confusion, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 732, 744 (2015) 
(citing Aaron Wall, Consumer Ad Awareness in Search Results, SEOBOOK (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.seobook.com/consumer-ad-awareness-search-results [https://perma.cc/7UWL-CYUB]). 
35. EVGENII “GENO” PRUSSAKOV, ONLINE SHOPPING THROUGH CONSUMERS EYES: A STUDY 
OF ONLINE USERS’ RESPONSES TO 107 QUESTIONS 17 (2008).  Note that others have described the 
author of the poll, Evgenii Prussakov, in the search engine optimization business as “a renowned 
affiliate marking specialist.”  Ravi Venkatesan, Do Users Trust Organic or Paid Results More on 
Search Engines, NAT. SEARCH BLOG (Aug. 9, 2009), 
http://www.naturalsearchblog.com/archives/2009/08/09/do-users-trust-organic-or-paid-results-more-
on-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/4ZNA-3PJ5].   
36. PRUSSAKOV, supra note 35, at 17. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 732–33 (explaining a “seminal 
paper” by Google founders that admitted the business goals of Google do not always align with the 
goal of providing quality search results).   
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Three professors of marketing and a partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher 
LLP wrote: 
Search engine companies might . . . note that they “set apart” 
sponsored results through the use of color shading or the use 
of small bullet points or other designators to the left of the 
abstract.  Nevertheless, such efforts are weak, vary by search 
engine and are likely not sufficient to clearly indicate to users 
the distinction between sponsored results and organic results.  
In one review, Consumer Reports WebWatch concluded that 
search engines have made the distinctions between paid and 
natural results less conspicuous to consumers and thereby 
increased confusion.  For example, one report noted that 
Yahoo! had changed “[o]nce bright red headings” of “sponsor 
results” to “light gray,” removed hyperlinks to web pages that 
explained its paid placement and paid inclusion programs, and 
that its remaining disclosure was “easy to miss.”  Since then, 
Yahoo! has made further changes to its results page that make 
it more difficult to distinguish between paid and organic 
results.  Yahoo! formerly used bullet points for certain sponsor 
results and numbering to denote algorithmic results.  It has 
removed those additional distinctions in what may be a 
calculated move to confuse more consumers into clicking on 
the sponsored results.40 
Professor Goldman and Angel Reyes III, a prominent attorney, have 
actually noted, “[C]onsumers routinely experience all types of confusion during 
their shopping experience, but trademark law only protects against very specific 
types of confusion.”41  They then argue that bars need not worry about 
competitive keyword advertising because “[t]he ad copy displayed in response 
to the purchased keyword might mislead consumers, but the process of 
displaying the ad itself does not create any false impressions about the 
respective lawyers’ relationships or associations.”42  Their reasoning, however, 
rings hollow for the potential clients confused by the ad copy.  It seems 
 
40. Id. at 745–46 (citing JØRGEN J. WOUTERS, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, STILL IN 
SEARCH OF DISCLOSURE: RE-EVALUATING HOW SEARCH ENGINES EXPLAIN THE PRESENCE OF 
ADVERTISING IN SEARCH RESULTS (2005), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/search-engine-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/38TW-CUYD]; JØRGEN J. 
WOUTERS, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, SEARCHING FOR DISCLOSURE: HOW SEARCH ENGINES 
ALERT CONSUMERS TO THE PRESENCE OF ADVERTISING IN SEARCH RESULTS (2004), 
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/press_release/searching-for-disclosure-how-search-engines-
alert-consumers-to-the-presence-of-advertising-in-search-results/ [https://perma.cc/N3KN-GFRL]. 
41. Goldman & Reyes III, supra note 3, at 111 n.42. 
42. Id. at 113. 
 
CROY_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2020  1:20 PM 
638 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:627 
somewhat ridiculous to argue that an attorney can benefit from an ad copy that 
is misleading and that the attorney is ultimately responsible for posting and 
escape responsibility merely because the process of displaying the ad can 
(debatably) be separated from the ad itself. 
Attorney advertising has long been regulated both as a means of protecting 
the public and as a means of ensuring the dignity of the profession.43  As others 
have suggested, these concerns are actually linked:  As the dignity of the 
profession is hindered, so is the protection of the public.44  Indeed, states have 
promulgated rules of professional conduct against misleading and even 
potentially misleading advertisements45 and at least one state has required, 
“Every advertisement . . . be labeled ‘Attorney Advertising’ on the first page, 
or on the home page in the case of a web site.”46  Florida has also banned unduly 
manipulative advertising.47  States have every reason to be concerned about 
competitive keyword advertising and mere analogies to trademark law should 
not negate this concern. 
Reliance on publicity rights is equally problematic.  A single case, Habush 
v. Cannon, has somehow sprung up in these various conversations about 
professional ethics, and yet, no one has been forthright enough to point out that:  
(1) the court stated it was a “close one”;48  
(2) the court found a broader interpretation of the relevant 
statute “reasonable”;49  
(3) the court certified the question to the Wisconsin Supreme 
 
43. See RUSSELL G. PEARCE, RENEE NEWMAN KNAKE, BRUCE A. GREEN, PETER A. JOY, SUNG 
HUI KIM, M. ELLEN MURPHY, & LAUREL S. TERRY, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 180 (3d ed. 2017) (“To succeed in private practice, a lawyer needs to find 
clients . . . .  Different types of lawyers will approach these tasks differently . . . .  Whatever these 
differences, though, lawyers are subject to the same ethical framework.  First, the ethics rules seek to 
protect clients and the public as consumers.  Second, they seek to protect the professional identity of 
lawyers.”). 
44. Daniel Callender, Comment, Attorney Advertising and the Use of Dramatization in 
Television Advertisements, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 89, 92–93 (2001). 
45. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR r. 4-7.14 (2019), https://www-
media.floridabar.org/uploads/2019/03/2019_09-Mar-2019-RRTFB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L9Q-
PFD7].   
46. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1(f) (2018), 
https://www.nysba.org/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=50671 [https://perma.cc/YCY5-6D3C]. 
47. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR r. 4-7.15, https://www-
media.floridabar.org/uploads/2019/03/2019_09-Mar-2019-RRTFB.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M49-
3ULR].   
48. Habush v. Cannon, 2013 WI App 34 ¶ 29, 346 Wis. 2d 709, 828 N.W.2d 876. 
49. Id. ¶ 20. 
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Court, which rejected it;50  
(4) the trial court and appellate court, while reaching the same 
decision, had contrary rationales;51 and  
(5) the Restatement (Second) of Torts has a broader cause of 
action than Wisconsin’s statute.52  
In summary, the court acknowledged, and the procedural history shows, the 
decision could have gone the other way.  Furthermore, the case is a decision of 
a mere intermediate appellate court.  Perhaps more importantly, it is axiomatic 
to professional responsibilities law that a violation of an ethics rule does not 
depend upon a violation of civil law.53  While trademark law at least has 
analogous concerns to attorney advertising regulations (protecting the public), 
these concerns are almost entirely absent from Habush. 
In large part, this Article serves to show how complex the debate is and 
how some states and scholars have oversimplified it by improper and 
sometimes overstated reference to trademark law and publicity rights.  It argues 
attorney participation in competitive keyword advertising is ethically 
problematic (or at least should be). 
The body of this Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part II gives a 
comprehensive overview of bar regulation of competitive keyword advertising.  
It explains the arguments for and against competitive keyword advertising 
made to date.  Part III explains the problems with some of these arguments, 
focusing on those arguments that use intellectual property as a starting point.  
In particular, it walks through various surveys that show consumers are 
confused by keyword advertising.  It also explains Habush in more detail in 
order to show reliance on it is overstated.  Part IV argues regulation is 
constitutional.  Advocates of competitive keyword advertising, such as Google, 
are quick to raise First Amendment arguments with bar associations.54  
However, these advocates fail to acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
50. Habush v. Cannon, No. 2011AP1769, 2012 WL 2345137, petition denied, 2012 WI 115, 344 
Wis. 2d 306, 822 N.W.2d 883. 
51. Compare Habush v. Cannon, No. 09-CV-18149, slip op. at 1 (Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct. June 
8, 2011) (holding that competitive keyword advertising constituted a “use” of another’s name but not 
an unreasonable use), with Habush, 2013 WI App 34 ¶ 35 (holding that competitive keyword 
advertising did not constitute a “use” of another’s name). 
52. See infra Section III.C. 
53. E.g., Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Marks (In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks), 
2003 WI 114, ¶ 50, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836 (per curiam) (citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 388 N.W.2d 176 (1986)). 
54. See Letter from Annabelle DanielVarda, Dir. of Trademarks, Google, to Elizabeth Clark 
Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Fla. Bar, at 1 (July 16, 2018) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
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expressly concluded that state bars can regulate activities that have “proved to 
be misleading in practice.”55  Nor do these advocates point out that the purchase 
of a keyword is arguably not “speech.”56  Even if it is speech, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has found that not even the news media can assert First Amendment 
protection against publicity rights.57  In summary, constitutional arguments 
against regulation are overstated.  Indeed, when imposing discipline on 
attorneys for competitive keyword advertising, neither South nor North 
Carolina ever considered constitutional arguments. 
II. MOOCHING OFF THE SUCCESS OF BETTER ATTORNEYS: AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE STATE OF REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
The 21st Century ambulance chasers58 use the internet.59  Competitive 
keyword advertising is one practice they engage in.60  This Part walks through 
the regulatory history of attorney participation in competitive keyword 
advertising chronologically.  This chronological approach shows how certain 
arguments and themes reoccur.  It begins first, however, with a brief overview 
of some of the rules implicated by the practice. 
A. An Overview of Relevant Rules 
Competitive keyword advertising implicates multiple rules.  First, Rule 
8.4(c) states, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”61  In reference to 
 
55. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982). 
56. Habush, slip op. at 6. 
57. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977). 
58. The use of the phrase ambulance chaser in this Article is not intended to refer generally to 
personal injury attorneys.  The phrase should be given its technical meaning: “a lawyer who approaches 
victims of street accidents in hopes of persuading them to sue for damages.”  Ambulance chaser, A 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2001). 
59. See Hudson, supra note 24, at 965 (quoting Bob Buckley, Lawyers Hustling Work Online a 
New Low, EXAMINER, Dec. 7, 2011, at B7) (“Hungry lawyers . . . are now using the Internet to hustle 
cases.”). 
60. Id. 
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  Rule 8.4(c) has been 
critiqued as vague.  E.g., Sean Keveney, Note, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 381, 382 (2002).  For example, one attorney referee noted the rule was unclear and at odds with 
attorneys’ obligation to be zealous advocates: 
[The attorney] was faced with a difficult decision, with concurrent and conflicting 
obligations: should he zealously defend his client, fulfill his constitutional 
obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel, and risk breaking a vague 
ethical rule . . . ? . . .  [The attorney] had to choose, and he chose reasonably, in 
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competitive keyword advertising, Timothy Pierce, Ethics Counsel to the 
Wisconsin State Bar, noted, “I do think the practice is really intended to at least 
create an impression, in the minds of some searchers, that connection exists 
when it does not.”62  This Article argues, additionally, the way in which 
competitive keyword advertisements are displayed is problematic because 
search engine providers seek to trick consumers into thinking the 
advertisements are organic results.63  Under a similar rationale, North Carolina 
relied on 8.4(c) to discipline an attorney for competitive keyword advertising.64 
Competitive keyword advertising also implicates Rule 7.1: 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication 
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.  A communication 
is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation 
of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading.65 
Mr. Pierce has stated the inability of consumers to distinguish competitive 
keyword advertisements from other search results raises Rule 7.1 concerns.66  
Lastly, South Carolina has used the attorney oath to impose discipline.67  While 
the oath can vary significantly from state to state, it generally requires attorneys 
to show respect for opposing counsel and the legal system more generally.68  
The Preamble to the Model Rules supports that attorneys should act respectfully 
toward other members of the legal profession.69 
On a final note, many of the debates discussed in this Part center around 
whether an attorney violated a disciplinary rule.  While relevant to 
 
light of his obligations and the vagueness of the Rules. 
Referee’s Report and Recommendation, Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley (In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hurley), No. 07 AP 478-D, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, at 36 (Wis. 2008).  The 
author of this Article agrees with the referee as applied to the facts of that particular case.  In reference 
to attorney advertising, however, an attorney’s obligation to be a zealous advocate is not implicated.  
62. Email from Timothy Pierce, Ethics Counsel to the State Bar of Wis., to Skylar Reese Croy, 
author (Mar. 6, 2019) (on file with the Marquette Law Review).  Note that Mr. Pierce is quoted with 
his permission. 
63. See infra Section III.A. 
64. See infra Section II.C. 
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
66. Email from Timothy Pierce to Skylar Reese Croy, supra note 62. 
67. In re Naert, 777 S.E.2d 823, 824 (S.C. 2015) (per curiam). 
68. E.g., Lawyer’s Oath, S.C. BAR, https://www.scbar.org/media/filer_public/6c/82/6c82017a-
a0a5-416b-beae-03b2dc2bcf94/oath.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4WM-Z87X].  For specific examples of 
attorney oaths of office by state, see Professionalism Codes, A.B.A. (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professio
nalism_codes/ [https://perma.cc/8U4L-T7LT].     
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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understanding the issue of competitive keyword advertising, this is a separate 
question from whether states should regulate competitive keyword advertising.  
This Article is primarily concerned with the latter. 
B. How a Kentucky Legal Ethics Attorney Walked on Thin Ice 
“In 2004, a Kentucky legal ethics attorney, Benjamin Cowgill, bid on a 
Google keyword coinciding with the name of a competitor attorney, Peter 
Ostermiller.”70  Mr. Ostermiller believed the practice was deceptive and 
complained.71  Specifically, Mr. Ostermiller suggested some users might think 
that he sponsored Mr. Cowgill because the advertisement said, “sponsored 
link.”72  Mr. Cowgill took the advertisement down one day after being called 
by a local reporter.73  Mr. Cowgill defended himself by suggesting he was just 
making a good business decision.74  One commentator compared Mr. Cowgill’s 
advertisement to “standing in front of another lawyer’s office with a sandwich 
board saying, ‘Would you consider coming down to my office instead?’”75  Not 
all, however, were so quick to condemn Mr. Cowgill.  Mr. Hornsby, an ABA 
attorney, stated, 
So I go to Google and type in lawyer ethics Ostermiller.  The 
search comes up with sites to . . . some blog about law firm 
marketing . . . , along with Peter Ostermiller.  On the other side 
of the page, in a shaded area that I know to include 
advertisements, is a link to the site of Ben Cowgill, apparently 
another lawyer who is also an expert on disciplinary matters. 
From my point of view, this search has now given me a 
choice.  One lawyer may be too expensive, not available, or 
subjectively just not a good fit for me.  I don’t see it as 
misleading.  To me, it’s a matter of obtaining more information 
about an issue of critical importance.  It is from this 
perspective that lawyers have the First Amendment right to 
 
70. Brief of Defendants-Respondents, supra note 20, at 20.  
71. Jacob Jacoby & Mark Sableman, Keyword-Based Advertising: Filling in Factual Voids 
(GEICO v. Google), 97 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 710 (2007). 
72. Kevin O’Keefe, Lawyer Buys Competitor’s Name as Google Adword, Other Lawyer Cries 
Foul, REAL LAW. (July 6, 2004), https://kevin.lexblog.com/2004/07/06/lawyer-buys-competitors-
name-as-google-adword-other-lawyer-cries-foul/ [https://perma.cc/9ETE-FRGC]; see also Jacoby & 
Sableman, supra note 71, at 710. 
73. O’Keefe, supra note 72; see Jacoby & Sableman, supra note 71, at 709–10.   
74. Jacoby & Sableman, supra note 71, at 710 (quoting Web Ad for Lawyer Linked to Competitor 
Spurs Dispute, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., July 6, 2004). 
75. Id.  
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advertise.76  
The legal ethicists that weighed in at the time generally assumed consumers 
could recognize advertisements and were not confused.77  Notably, they merely 
assumed this without any empirical evidence. Indeed, the key words in the 
above quote may very well be “I know to include advertisements.”  Mr. 
Hornsby might have known how to spot advertisements but that says little about 
the public’s ability. 
Notably, Google abandoned the term “sponsored links” in favor of “ads” in 
2010.78  Some commentators have suggested that the switch was caused by an 
internal report that suggested the term “sponsored links” confused “even well-
educated, seasoned Internet consumers.”79  Indeed, the report admitted that 
these consumers “are sometimes even unaware that sponsored links are, in 
actuality, advertisements.”80  An incorrect reoccurring theme of regulation in 
this area is the assumption that typical consumers are familiar with search 
engine practices. 
“The Kentucky Advertising Commission, an agency of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court and Bar Association, which enforces attorney advertising rules 
and regulations, . . . took no action following its review of [Mr.] Cowgill’s 
sponsored link.”81  However, the record does not explain why.82  Notably, Mr. 
Cowgill was the “former Chief Bar Counsel for the Kentucky Bar 
Association.”83  To add to the irony, he also taught professional responsibilities 
at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.84 
Mr. Cowgill may have been the first to be caught with his hands in the 
internet cookie jar,85 but he is not the last. 
 
76. Brief of Defendants-Respondents, supra note 20, at 20–21 (first emphasis added).    
77. See O’Keefe, supra note 72. 
78. Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 740 n.30. 
79. Id. (quoting Rosetta Stone v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 160 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
80. Id. (quoting Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 160). 
81. Brief of Defendants-Respondents, supra note 20, at 20.  
82. Combined Reply Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 25, 
at 10. 
83. Ben Cowgill Booked for Kentucky AAML/LBA April Seminar, DIVORCE L.J. (Jan. 31, 2007), 
https://louisvilledivorce.typepad.com/info/2007/01/benjamin_cowgil.html [https://perma.cc/5EGE-
S9RZ].   
84. Id. 
85. See O’Keefe, supra note 72 (“Representatives of the American Bar Association, as well as 
lawyer-marketing professionals who the reporter talked to never heard of a lawyer acquiring a link to 
a competing lawyer’s name.  I am not so sure it does not happen though – especially in the personal 
injury area where things get pretty competitive on the search engines.”). 
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C. North Carolina’s Infamous Ethics Opinion 
The next key event in the history of competitive keyword advertising 
regulation came in 2012.  That year, North Carolina issued what has become an 
infamous ethics opinion.86  This opinion has been deeply criticized in the 
scholarly literature and disregarded by other bar associations.87   
The problem with the opinion is its brevity.  After the opinion explains the 
inquiry, its reasoning section is mere few sentences: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Rule 
8.4(c).  Dishonest conduct includes conduct that shows a lack 
of fairness or straightforwardness.  See In the Matter of 
Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 767—68 (DC App. 1990).  The 
intentional purchase of the recognition associated with one 
lawyer’s name to direct consumers to a competing lawyer’s 
website is neither fair nor straightforward.  Therefore, it is a 
violation of Rule 8.4(c) for a lawyer to select another lawyer’s 
name to be used in his own keyword advertising.88 
In 2013, the North Carolina Bar censured Attorney David J. Turlington III 
for participating in competitive keyword advertising.89  The censure, however, 
did little more than cite the 2012 opinion and declare competitive keyword 
advertising was dishonest.90 
The conclusory nature of the opinion and censure has made them easy 
punching bags.  Professor Goldman and Mr. Reyes, for example, called them 
“anachronistic and regressive.”91  To them, competitive keyword advertising 
“improves competition and benefits consumers.”92  They felt that “[a]dvertising 
practices that enhance competition cannot be ‘unfair’ or ‘not 
straightforward.’”93  Furthermore, they argued the opinion and censure created 
“a new intellectual property right in lawyers’ names.”94  They concluded such 
action ought to be done by “elected legislators . . . subject to careful public 
scrutiny.”95 
 
86. N.C. State Bar, supra note 21. 
87. Goldman & Reyes III, supra note 3, at 113–14.   
88. N.C. State Bar, supra note 21. 
89. Grievance Comm. of N.C. State Bar, supra note 21. 
90. See id. 
91. Goldman & Reyes III, supra note 3, at 103. 
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D. Florida: Round One 
In 2013, the Florida Bar’s Board of Governors ordered its Standing 
Committee on Advertising “to draft an opinion regarding the use of search 
engine optimization techniques such as metatags and hidden text.”96  “The 
committee approved Proposal Advisory Opinion A-12-1 on March 5, 2013, 
which, in part, concluded” competitive keyword advertising is “misleading and 
therefore impermissible.”97  Similarly to the North Carolina opinion, A-12-1 
was somewhat conclusory.  The opinion was a mere two pages and dealt with 
both the use of metatags and hidden text as well as competitive keyword 
advertising.98  In relevant part, the opinion stated: 
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in “deceptive or 
inherently misleading advertising.” . . .  The Committee is of 
the opinion that certain website content and the use of certain 
internet search engine optimization techniques can be false, 
deceptive or misleading conduct that is 
prohibited . . . .  Examples include “hidden text” or “meta 
tags” that use another lawyer’s or law firm’s name without a 
proper purpose, . . . . 
. . . .  
Another example of a false, deceptive or misleading 
technique would be the use of another lawyer’s name or the 
name of another law firm in a firm’s website when the firm has 
no legitimate connection, relationship or history with that 
lawyer or law firm and the reference is purely intended to 
unfairly manipulate search engines in favor of the firm’s 
website by using the name of another firm or lawyer. . . . 
The same analysis applies when lawyers purchase 
advertising on a search engine keyed to specific words or 
phrases, e.g. buying Google Adwords.  Lawyers may not 
purchase the name of another lawyer or law firm as a key 
word . . . .99 
A-12-1 caused quite the controversy.  Regulation of metatags and hidden 
text was viewed as outdated.  Tom Copeland, a Director of Marketing at a 
financial group, explained, 
The use of hidden text on a website, whether by disguising the 
text to blend in with a background, or making the font point so 
 
96. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12. 
97. Id. 
98. Fla. Bar Standing Comm. on Advert., Proposed Advisory Op. A-12-1 (Mar. 5, 2013). 
99. Id. at 1–2. 
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small that it’s virtually invisible, is a tactic that was once, circa 
1999, in practice by “black hat,” or unethical SEOs, but swiftly 
recognized and punished by the major search engines.100 
Indeed, Mr. Copeland noted that the same day A-12-1 was issued, “Google 
was awarded by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office United States Patent 
#8,392,823 entitled ‘Systems and methods for detecting hidden texts and 
hidden links.’”101  The Florida Bar’s Board of Governors ultimately agreed, 
stating that “meta tags and hidden text are outdated forms of web 
optimization . . . and can be dealt with via existing rules prohibiting misleading 
forms of advertising.”102  The linking of these two problems is, perhaps, partly 
responsible for the failure of Florida to pass specific regulation of either.  
Still, several arguments were made specifically regarding regulation of 
competitive keyword advertising.  On April 29, 2013, Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, 
the Ethics Counselor for the Florida Bar, received the first of many letters she 
would receive on A-12-1.103  Three professors, including Professor Goldman, 
and one law student wrote her a letter outlining three arguments against 
prohibiting competitive keyword advertising.104  Indeed, the letter included a 
heading that stated, “Competitive Keyword Advertising Should be Encouraged, 
Not Banned.”105 
Their first argument was that names are in short supply.106  They argued, 
“Many lawyers share the same name, and many lawyers’ names are also 
dictionary words.  As a result, if a consumer searches using a lawyer’s name, 
we cannot assume the consumer wanted to find any specific person.”107  This 
argument is so bad; it is almost not worth responding to.  No one has argued 
that a lawyer could not purchase his or her own name.  To the extent lawyers 
share names, oh well.  The purchase of one’s own name is clearly not 
misleading.  Furthermore, it seems quite safe to assume consumers have a 
specific person in mind when they search a name. 
In fact, their second argument contradicts their first.  They argued, “[A] 
consumer familiar with John Smith, Esq.’s expertise wants to find lawyers who 
 
100. Unpublished Letter to the Editors of the Fla. Bar News, by Tom Copeland, Dir. of Mktg. 
for Blatt Fin. Grp., LLC (Apr. 8, 2013) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
101. Id. 
102. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12. 
103. Letter from Faye E. Jones, Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Eric Goldman, & Jake McGowan to Elizabeth 
Clark Tarbert, supra note 27, at 1. 
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provide comparable services.”108  While some consumers undoubtedly do this 
kind of searching, no reasonable consumer would make such a search and not 
expect to see results for a specific John Smith.  Also, it is worth noting that most 
internet users, as acknowledged in a footnote of the letter, do not engage in this 
kind of searching.109 
Lastly came the intellectual property arguments.  They argued, “[C]ourts 
consistently have held that competitive keyword advertising does not violate 
intellectual property rights.”110  They proceeded to cite trademark law and 
Habush, which was decided earlier the same year.111 
The second letter came from Attorney Timothy P. Chinaris, the same 
attorney who later represented Mr. Hanna, acting on behalf of his client, a 
lawyer referral service known as 1-800-411-Pain.112  The letter stated, “We 
agree with the principle underlying the position expressed in the advisory 
opinion.”113  It went on to argue for broader language in the proposed 
prohibition to protect lawyer referral services.114 
Google weighed in on December 2, 2013.115  Google’s Director of 
Trademarks argued the ban was “unconstitutionally overbroad and unnecessary 
in light of existing rules and advisory opinions governing attorney 
advertising.”116 
“The Board of Governors voted 23-19 to withdraw Proposed Advisory 
Opinion A-12-1 on December 13, 2013 . . . .”117  In the Board’s opinion, 
competitive keyword advertising was permissible so “long as the resulting 
advertisements or sponsored links clearly are advertising based on their 
placement and wording . . . .”118  In other words, the Board believed consumers 
would not be confused by such advertisements as long as there were clear 
markers.  Indeed, their logic was very similar to the legal ethicists that weighed 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 2 n.5 (citing Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 31, at 483–84). 
110. Id. at 2. 
111. Id. 
112. Letter from Timothy P. Chinaris, Att’y for Alex Hanna, to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics 
Counsel, Fla. Bar (July 22, 2013), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2018/03/CAC-Meeting-
Materials-March-20-2018-Teleconference-108-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y342-HG4B]. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. 
115. Letter from Terri Chen to Eugene Keith Pettis, supra note 28. 
116. Id. at 1. 
117. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12. 
118. Id. 
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in on Mr. Cowgill’s controversy.119  Problematically, they presumed search 
engine providers were using sufficient labeling techniques.120  
E. South Carolina and the Attorney’s Oath 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of South Carolina weighed in on the debate in 
In re Naert.121  Two timeshare litigation partners “created a Google AdWords 
account as part of the[ir] law firm’s internet marketing campaign.”122  The law 
firm bid on the names of opposing parties’ attorneys as well as a company the 
firm was suing on behalf of clients.123  The resulting advertisement had two 
lines, with the first stating, “Timeshare Attorney in SC–Ripped Off? Lied to? 
Scammed?”  And a second line read, “Hilton Head Island, SC Free Consult.”124  
The South Carolina Office of Disciplinary Counsel and Attorney Naert “entered 
into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent . . . .”125  The court first held the 
conduct violated Rule 7.2(d): “[A]ny communication made pursuant to Rule 7, 
RPC, shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer 
responsible for its content.”126  The court then publicly reprimanded the partners 
for violating the Lawyer’s Oath.127  “[B]y taking [the] Lawyer’s Oath, lawyer[s] 
pledge[] to opposing parties and their counsel fairness, integrity, and civility in 
all written communications and to employ only such means consistent with 
trust, honor, and principles of professionalism.”128 
F. Texas Weighs in 
In 2016, the Texas Bar issued an opinion, finding that attorneys could 
engage in competitive keyword advertising if a reasonable person would not 
associate the advertising attorney with the searched-for attorney.129  The 
opinion suggested that typical competitive keyword advertisements, which 
include the name of the advertising attorney and a link, do not create a false 
impression of association.130  In keeping with other opinions on this topic, it 
 
119. See O’Keefe, supra note 73. 
120. See BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12. 
121. 777 S.E.2d 823 (S.C. 2015) (per curiam). 
122. Id. at 823. 
123. Id. at 824. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 823. 
126. Id. at 824. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., supra note 18, at 2–3.   
130. Id. 
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was short.  Important to the purposes of this Article, it cited Habush.131  
However, the opinion seems to misunderstand Habush.  The manner in which 
Habush is cited suggests the opinion’s author thought Habush stood for the 
proposition that consumers were not confused by competitive keyword 
advertising.  However, Habush had almost nothing to do with consumer 
confusion.132  The Texas opinion also looked at the precedent out of North 
Carolina, which it found unpersuasive.133  The opinion states, “[G]iven the 
general use by all sorts of businesses of names of competing businesses as 
keywords in search-engine advertising, such use by Texas lawyers in their 
advertising is neither dishonest nor fraudulent nor deceitful and does not 
involve misrepresentation.”134  However, a shield to ethical responsibility 
should not be “but everyone else does it.”  The entire point of bar associations 
is to regulate the legal profession in ways other professions are not.  Surely, no 
legal ethicist would ever argue “other professionals constantly talk about their 
clients so lawyers should not have to follow special confidentiality rules.” 
Legal ethicists quickly weighed in, and they framed the issue similar to the 
Texas opinion: Is it a violation even if it is common business practice?  
Professor Meredith J. Duncan, who teaches professional responsibilities at the 
University of Houston Law Center, stated, “I am conflicted regarding whether 
the lawyer conduct described in this opinion is sneaky conduct or whether it is 
just savvy advertising.”135  This Article argues it is both.  Indeed, its sneakiness 
is what makes it “savvy advertising.”  Professor Duncan also predicted more 
states would address the issue given the split of authorities.136 
 
131. Id. at 3 (citing Habush v. Cannon, 2013 WI App 34, 346 Wis. 2d 709, 828 N.W.2d 876). 
132. Id. 2–3 (“Moreover, since a person familiar enough with the internet to use a search engine 
to seek a lawyer should be aware that there are advertisements presented on web pages showing search 
results, it appears highly unlikely that a reasonable person using an internet search engine would be 
misled into thinking that every search result indicates that a lawyer shown in the list of search results 
has some type of relationship with the lawyer whose name was used in the search.  Compare Habush 
v. Cannon, 828 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no violation of Wisconsin right-of-privacy 
statute when one law firm used the name of a competing law firm as a keyword in search-engine 
advertising).”).  See the discussion of Habush infra, explaining the reasoning in the opinion. 
133. Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., supra note 18, at 3 (“In reaching this 
conclusion, this Committee has considered but does not concur with 2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 14 
of the Ethics Committee of the North Carolina State Bar (April 27, 2012) . . . .”). 
134. Id. 
135. David L. Hudson, Jr., Texas Lawyers May Use Competitors’ Name in Keyword Marketing, 
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/search_engine_marketing_legal_ethics 
[https://perma.cc/MB2Z-KUNC].   
136. Id. 
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G. Florida: Round Two 
Coming almost full circle in this story, Florida again considered a ban in 
2018.  The controversy started with Mr. Hanna’s letter discussed above.  Mr. 
Hanna argued for a rule stating: 
Using Names of Other Lawyers or Law Firms in Internet 
Advertising.  It is inherently misleading or deceptive for a 
lawyer to intentionally use, or arrange for the use of, the name 
of a lawyer not in the same firm or the name of another law 
firm as a words or phrases that trigger the display of the 
lawyer’s advertising on the Internet or other media.  This 
prohibition applies regardless of whether the lawyer directly 
uses the other’s name or does so indirectly, such as through 
participation in a group advertising program.137 
A proposed comment for the rule stated: 
The reputation of a lawyer or law firm is valuable and is 
personal to that lawyer or law firm.  A lawyer’s name and 
reputation may be the lawyer’s greatest professional asset.  
Principles of professionalism, as well as the bar’s interest in 
protecting the public by preventing deceptive advertising, 
dictate that a lawyer’s name should not intentionally be used 
by another lawyer in an Internet advertising scheme or 
campaign.  A lawyer’s intentional use of another’s name as 
keywords or search terms in order to attract prospective clients 
to the lawyer’s advertising is a misuse of the other’s name and 
reputation and is inherently misleading or deceptive.138 
The Board of Governors focused on whether the practice was “inherently 
misleading.”139  Importantly, the Board considered Habush.140  In May of 2018, 
the Board Review Committee on Professional Ethics “narrowly voted [the 
proposal] down.”141  “[T]he proposal failed 4-5, so close that some prevailing 
members said they were willing to reconsider.”142  The Committee Chair 
described the debate as “spirited.”143 
 
137. Letter from Timothy P. Chinaris to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, supra note 2, at app. A. 
138. Id. 
139. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12. 
140. Id. at 3. 
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Out of fear that the issue was not dead, Google once again authored a letter 
to the Florida Bar in the summer of 2018.144  Google made similar arguments 
to those found in its 2013 letter.  Primarily, Google argued the proposal was 
unconstitutional.145  Google also argued that competitive keyword advertising 
is good policy because it promotes competition.146 
H. Florida: Round Three 
The issue has not died in Florida.  In May of 2019, the Florida Board of 
Governors voted once more on a limit to competitive keyword advertising.147  
It awaits approval from the Supreme Court of Florida.  The new rule will read: 
Examples of Deceptive and Inherently Misleading 
Advertisements.  Deceptive or inherently misleading 
advertisements include, but are not limited to advertisements 
that contain: . . .  
. . . .  
(12) a statement or implication that another lawyer or law 
firm is part of, is associated with, or affiliated with the 
advertising law firm when that is not the case, including 
contact or other information presented in a way that 
misleads a person searching for a particular lawyer or law 
firm, or for information regarding a particular lawyer or law 
firm, to unknowingly contact a different lawyer or law 
firm.148 
A comment will explain, 
. . . Another example of impermissible conduct is use of 
another lawyer or law firm name as an Internet search term that 
triggers the display of an advertisement that does not clearly 
indicate that the advertisement is for a lawyer or law firm that 
is not the lawyer or law firm used as the search term. . . .  The 
triggered advertisement would not be misleading if the first 
text displayed is the name of the advertising lawyer or law firm 
and, if the displayed law firm name is a trade name that does 
not contain the name of a current or deceased partner, the name 
 
144. Letter from Annabelle DanielVarda to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, supra note 54. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2–3. 
147. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, FLA. BAR, DRAFT 20B. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO RULE 4-7.13 (GOOGLE ADWORDS) – FIRST READING (Nov. 14, 2018) (on file with the Marquette 
Law Review); Email from Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Fla. Bar, to Skylar Reese Croy, 
author (May 28, 2019) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
148. Id. 
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of the lawyer responsible for the advertisement is also 
displayed as the first text.149 
Professor Goldman and Lyrissa B. Lidsky, the Dean of the University of 
Missouri School of Law, wrote to the Florida Bar on this issue.150  (A 
preliminary draft of this Article was also forwarded for consideration.)  Their 
letter argued, “[T]rademark jurisprudence does not support any effort to 
regulate competitive keyword advertising based on perceived sponsorship, 
endorsement or affiliation.”151  Furthermore, the letter argued against the 
mandatory disclosure aspect of the rule with three points.  “First, including a 
competitor’s name in ad copy may advance a number of legitimate and pro-
consumer objectives, such as comparative advertising, critical advertising, or 
advertising to aggregate consumers who have legal claims against the 
competitor.”152  “Second, mandatory disclosure of the advertising attorney’s 
name makes sense only if that information helps consumers.”153  “Third, the 
mandatory disclosure of the advertising/responsible attorney’s name could 
meaningfully reduce the amount of information displayed in search engine 
advertisements, which are severely space-constrained.”154  The letter concludes, 
“[C]ompetitive keyword advertising restrictions cannot be justified by 
intellectual property or consumer protection law . . . .”155 
Notably, the letter admits competitive keyword advertising “could be 
deceptive or misleading for other reasons, but the absence of the advertising 
attorney’s name in the ad copy doesn’t contribute to those defects.”156  In a blog 
post, Professor Goldman argued, “[T]his rule is pointless at best and possibly 
pernicious at worst.  The Florida Bar has no evidence that consumers are 
currently suffering any detriment from the status quo . . . .”157 
 
149. Id. 
150. Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor of Law and Co-Dir., High Tech Law Inst., Santa Clara 
Univ. Sch. of Law, and Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Dean and Judge C.A. Leedy Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. 
Sch. of Law, to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Fla. Bar (Nov. 25, 2018) (on file with the 
Marquette Law Review). 
151. Id. at 1. 
152. Id. at 2. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 3. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Eric Goldman, The Ongoing Saga of the Florida Bar’s Angst About Competitive Keyword 
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I. New Jersey Takes a Stance Similar to Florida 
In August of 2019, a New Jersey ethics panel published an advisory opinion 
dated from June.158  The panel noted that the purchase of another’s name is not 
itself a “communication.”159  Therefore, it found Rule 7.1 was not implicated.  
For similar reasons, the panel also rejected an argument that the practice 
violated Rule 1.4, which requires a lawyer to “inform a prospective client of 
how, when and where the client may communicate with the lawyer.”160 
The panel then got to Rule 8.4(c).  It stated, “The Committee concurs with 
the approach of Texas and Wisconsin and finds that purchasing keywords of a 
competitor lawyer’s name is not conduct that involves dishonestly, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.”161  Once again, Habush was inappropriately cited 
for the proposition that competitive keyword advertising is ethical.  It also 
rejected an argument that competitive keyword advertising is “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”162  The opinion did, however, conclude that “[a] 
lawyer may not . . . pay the internet search engine company to insert, a 
hyperlink on the name or website URL of a competitor lawyer that will divert 
the user from the searched-for website to the lawyer’s own law firm website.”163  
This understanding of Rule 8.4(c) is analogous to Florida’s new regulation.164 
Like other opinions, the panel presumed users know what results are 
advertisements: “The user can choose which website to select and the search 
engine ordinarily will mark the keyword-purchased website as paid or 
‘sponsored.’”165  Simply put, this assumption is incorrect.  The incorrect nature 
of this assumption calls into question whether New Jersey correctly decided 
that Rule 7.1 is not violated. 
III. AN UNPOPULAR ARGUMENT: RECONSIDERING REGULATION OF 
COMPETITIVE KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
The messy and conflicted history of attorney participation in competitive 
keyword advertising demonstrates the policy considerations.  On one hand, 
some believe that competitive keyword advertising helps consumers and 
 
158. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Appointed by the Supreme Court of N.J., supra note 17, 
at 1. 
159. Id. at 2. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 3. 
162. Id. at 3–4. 
163. Id. at 4. 
164. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 147. 
165. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Appointed by the Supreme Court of N.J., supra note 17, 
at 3. 
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promotes competition.  These advocates believe competitive keyword 
advertising is not misleading and that regulation is unconstitutional and would 
create a new form of intellectual property.  On the other hand, those opposed 
argue consumers are, in fact, confused.  Furthermore, they argue that the 
reputation of an attorney—and thus the attorney’s name—has special 
significance.  They see attorney participation in keyword advertising as 
misleading and a violation of the attorney’s oath, which imposes duties owed 
to other attorneys. 
Importantly, the debate over whether competitive keyword advertising is 
misleading has no framework.  And, as this Part argues, both sides are partly 
right.  Advocates of competitive keyword advertising appear to base their 
understanding of what is misleading on trademark law, which is concerned with 
confusion around source, sponsorship, and affiliation.  While there is confusion 
surrounding competitive keyword advertising, it does not appear to be, for the 
most part, this kind of confusion. 
This Part summarizes a substantial number of surveys in order to show the 
amount and kind of confusion.  Notably, this data suggests most consumers are 
not confused about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of a product when it 
comes to competitive keyword advertising.  This explains why trademark 
literature, mostly, though not always, favors competitive keyword advertising.  
However, the surveys show a lot of confusion about other aspects of 
competitive keyword advertising.  Furthermore, this Part challenges the 
reliance on Habush found in the literature and by state bars.  Lastly, this Part 
articulates some other intellectual property rationales—personality 
justifications, dilution, and commercial morality—that have appeared in the 
debate but have not been properly labeled.  Broadly, this Part articulates the 
over-reliance of trademark and publicity law surrounding the debate. 
A. Confusion About Confusion 
The bars’ competitive keyword advertising debates often invoke the terms 
“inherently misleading” and “deceptive.”  The debate, however, has not taken 
the time to properly define these terms. 
Surveys going back to 2002 demonstrate various confusion.  A Princeton 
study from 2002 “concluded that more than 60% of respondents were unaware 
that search engines accept payment to list certain sites more prominently than 
others in search results.”166  Over time, consumers improved but not as 
substantially as, perhaps, expected.  A 2003 study concluded “[e]ven well 
 
166. Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 743. 
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informed or Web-savvy users may not know whether a listing is a paid ad.”167  
A Pew study in 2005 “concluded that 62% of consumers cannot differentiate 
between sponsored and non-sponsored links.”168  As one article explained: 
[A] 2012 SEO Book study in which 1,000 Internet searchers 
were shown search results pages with between three and four 
sponsored links and asked, “Does this search result have ads 
on it?” showed that between 37% and 55% of respondents 
answered “no” based on the particular search engine results 
page shown.169 
In 2013, Professors David J. Franklyn and David A. Hyman published 
survey results in an article appropriately titled, Trademarks as Search Engine 
Keywords: Much Ado About Something?170  This article, published in the 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, made yet another convincing case that 
competitive keyword advertising causes confusion—just not the kind of 
confusion trademark law cares about.171  They conducted three surveys from 
2010 to 2012 with about 1000 participants each.172  The participants represented 
a “broad cross-section of the population.”173  They published a table with some 
telling results.  
 
167. Id. (quoting LESLIE MARABLE, CONSUMER WEBWATCH, FALSE ORACLES: CONSUMER 
REACTION TO LEARNING THE TRUTH ABOUT HOW SEARCH ENGINES WORK, RESULTS OF AN 
ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY (June 30, 2003), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/false-oracles.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q52Q-2ZCC]). 
168. Id. (citing DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SEARCH ENGINE USERS: INTERNET 
SEARCHERS ARE CONFIDENT, SATISFIED AND TRUSTING – BUT THEY ARE ALSO UNAWARE AND 
NAÏVE (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/2005/01/23/search-engine-users/ [https://perma.cc/L6C9-
CRJ7]).  Notably, a few studies have observed lower levels of confusion, around twenty percent.  
PRUSSAKOV, supra note 35, at 16 (suggesting eighteen percent of users cannot tell the difference 
between sponsored and organic results); GORD HOTCHKISS, ENQUIRO SEARCH SOLUTIONS, INTO THE 
MIND OF THE SEARCHER, 10 (2003–2004), 
https://www.richswebdesign.com/InsidetheMindoftheSearcher.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY58-UMWJ] 
(“In general we found the majority of users in the group were pretty clear about what was a sponsored 
link and what was an organic link on the page.  Only 20% of participants had some confusion, and this 
tended to be among the less experienced search engine users.”).  Even if this kind of confusion is 
around twenty percent, that is still a significant problem. 
169. Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 744 (citing Wall, supra note 34). 
170. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 31. 
171. Id. at 484. 
172. Id. at 511–12. 
173. Id. at 512. 
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Table 1: A Reproduction of the Results of Professors Franklyn & Hyman’s 
Study Regarding Consumer Knowledge of Search Page Architecture174 
 Yes No Not Sure 
Aware that search companies 
are paid to feature certain 
sites more prominently? 
61% 27% 12% 
Know the difference between 
sponsored and unsponsored 
search results?175 
42% 31% 27% 
36% 42% 22% 
Easy to distinguish between 
paid and unpaid search 
results? 
35% 38% 27% 
Know where the paid results 
usually appear? 43% 40% 17% 
 
Professors Franklyn and Hyman then presented consumers with the graphic 

















174. Id. at 513. 
175. This question was asked in two of the three surveys and the results are thus shown for both.  
Id. at 513 n.158. 
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“[F]or sections A and B, the correct answer is ‘paid links,’ while for section 
C, the correct answer is ‘unpaid links.’”177  The results of the survey were scary 







176. Id. at 514. 
177. Id. 
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Table 2: Consumer Ability to Identify Paid Advertisements178 
 Section of Figure 3 
A B C 
Unpaid Links 15% 24% 51% 
Paid Links 46% 38% 16% 
Google’s Special 
Marketing Team 17% 15% 11% 
Not Sure/Do Not 
Know 21% 22% 20% 
Other 1% 1% 2% 
Cumulative Performance 
All 3 Correct 16% 
2 of 3 Correct 30% 
2 of 3 Correct 
(paid only)179 21% 
1 of 3 Correct 21% 
0 of 3 Correct 27% 
  
“[O]nly 16% of survey respondents correctly answered whether all three 
sections in Figure [3] included paid or unpaid links.”180  The study further 
showed “just under half of survey respondents thought the distinction between 
paid and unpaid links was clear . . . .”181 
The confusion may come, in part, from the fact that search engine providers 
occasionally change the search results page architecture and different search 
engines use different architecture.182  Indeed, Google results today look quite 
different than the screenshot used in the study discussed above.  Figure 4 is a 
screenshot taken on March 16, 2019.  
 
178. Id. at 515. 
179. The study noted, “If we focus only on paid Ads (sections A and B), . . . only 21% of survey 
respondents answered correctly.”  Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id at 516. 
182. See Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 732, 745–46. 
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Figure 4: Screenshot of Search Results on March 16, 2019 
 
Note that the box on the right of the screen is not an advertisement.183  
Historically, however, results on the right have been advertisements, like in the 
screenshot shown in Figure 3.  Also note how tiny the “Ad” label to the left of 
the URL of the first result is.  Additionally, there is no shading or color to set 
off the advertisement. 
The article concluded, “[W]e find little evidence of confusion in the 
traditional [trademark] sense, but there is plenty of uncertainty about other 
matters.”184  The professors noted that “[j]udges have assumed that consumers 
pay attention to search page architecture and labels in deciding which links to 
click upon.”185  Bars regulating keyword advertising have made similar 
assumptions.  Indeed, the Florida Bar’s 2013 decision relied heavily on this 
 
183. The author of this Article admittedly had to look this up because he was not sure.  Your 
Business Information in the Knowledge Panel, GOOGLE MY BUS. HELP (last visited Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://support.google.com/business/answer/6331288?hl=en [https://perma.cc/5HQL-DLJV] (“Like 
search results, whether or not a business’s information will appear in the knowledge panel is 
determined by a variety of factors.  Relevance, distance, and the prominence of the business all 
contribute to its standing in local search results.  Verifying a business does not guarantee that it will 
appear in the Knowledge Panel.  There’s no way to request or pay for a better ranking on Google 
Search, Google Maps, or Google My Business.”).   
184. Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 31, at 536. 
185. Id. at 518. 
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assumption.  “The Board of Governors voted . . . to withdraw Proposed 
Advisory Opinion A-12-1 . . . because the purchase of ad words . . . is 
permissible as long as the resulting advertisements or sponsored links clearly 
are advertising based on their placement and wording . . . .”186  Even prominent 
scholars have made this assumption.  Professor David S. Levine stated, 
“[P]eople looking for Attorney Smith would be unlikely to say, ‘Oh, I can’t tell 
the difference between Attorneys Smith and Jones.’”187  Perhaps few consumers 
would go through with hiring Attorney Jones thinking it was Attorney Smith, 
but evidently a significant number might click on Attorney Jones link without 
understanding it is an advertisement. 
B. Confusion as to Source? 
Notably, clients have gone through with hiring an attorney they did not 
intend to hire—in other words, some confusion in the traditional trademark 
sense exists.  Nothing in the Florida Bar’s record suggests Mr. Hanna was lying 
when he alleged people who were not even his clients threatened to file 
complaints against him.188  Furthermore, trademark law is concerned even with 
mere initial interest confusion, meaning a client need not go through with 
actually hiring the wrong attorney.189  The fact that the client was initially 
confused is sufficient because “diversion often results in consumer frustration, 
which paradoxically may be directed not at the source of the diversion, but at 
the company that the consumer originally sought.”190  The concern of Mr. 
Hanna’s attorney—that competitive keyword advertising may cause distrust of 
the legal system—is legitimate. 
Confusion as to source, sponsorship, and affiliation—the type of confusion 
trademark law is concerned with—is likely between 1.5 and 7.4 percent.  In a 
recent competitive keyword advertising case, one expert testified to confusion 
at a rate of 7.4 percent.191  The trial court struck the survey as unreliable.192  On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit, while expressing concerns about the survey, found 
 
186. BD. REVIEW COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
187. David S. Levine, Ten Challenges in Technology and Intellectual Property Law for 2015: 
Remarks at the Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law Symposium, 15 WAKE 
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 563, 567 (2015). 
188. See supra Part I for a discussion of Mr. Hanna’s story. 
189. See Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 743. 
190. Id. at 744–45. 
191. John Benton Russell, Note, New Tenth Circuit’s Standards: Competitive Keyword 
Advertising and Initial Interest Confusion in 1-800 Contacts v. Lens.com, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
993, 1009 (2015). 
192. Id. at 1010. 
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the district court should not have excluded it.193  The Tenth Circuit affirmed, 
somewhat puzzlingly, based on other data, concluding the confusion rate was 
at most 1.5 percent.194  Essentially, the court concluded confusion had to be low 
“because the search engine’s own data showed that only twenty five Internet 
users (1.5% of the total number who viewed the advertisement) clicked on its 
competitor’s sponsored link . . . .”195 
“J. Thomas McCarthy, a prominent trademark scholar, indicates that a rate 
of confusion less than 10 percent is poor evidence for actual confusion, and 
lower rates can be evidence against confusion.”196  It follows that the amount 
of confusion caused by competitive keyword advertising is unlikely to be 
sufficient for trademark infringement. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that bar organizations cannot be 
concerned about this kind of confusion.  Even if it is only between 1.5 and 7.4 
percent, that is still a problem.  Furthermore, those confused in the trademark 
sense may be the most vulnerable and in need of protection: they may not have 
a strong grasp of the English language197 or may be elderly and unfamiliar with 
search engines.  And, at a minimum, keyword advertisements that explicitly use 
the other attorney’s name should be banned because they have substantial 
potential for abuse. 
C. Please Stop Citing Habush 
In addition to trademark analogies, there are also arguments based in 
publicity rights.  As seen above, Habush is a seminal case, cited by scholar and 
bar organizations in order to justify regulation.  This Article makes a simple 
plea: Please stop citing it.  Alternatively, acknowledge when citing it just how 
close the case was and that its reasoning is only tangentially relevant. 
Habush Habush & Rottier is a “well-known” Wisconsin law firm.198  Two 
of its named partners, Robert Habush and Daniel Rottier, are among the best-
known attorneys in Wisconsin, “and their names have commercial and 
 
193. Id. at 1013. 
194. Id. at 1014. 
195. Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 753. 
196. Russell, supra note 190, at 1004 (citing 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:189 (4th ed. 2014)). 
197. Memorandum from Precise Protective Research, Inc. to Client, supra note 7, at 2. 
198. Habush v. Cannon, 2013 WI App 34 ¶ 2, 346 Wis. 2d 709, 828 N.W.2d 876. 
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advertising value.”199  A competitor of Habush Habush & Rottier is Cannon & 
Dunphy.200 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated the facts as follows: 
Beginning in 2009, Cannon & Dunphy bid on the keyword 
search terms “Habush” and “Rottier” through the search 
engines Google, Yahoo!, and Bing.  This bidding assured that, 
in response to an Internet user’s search of the terms “Habush” 
or “Rottier,” links to the website of Cannon & Dunphy would 
appear as the first result above the organic results lists.201 
The trial court’s slip opinion contained a screenshot, shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: A Screenshot from the Trial Court’s Opinion202 
 
Mr. Habush and Mr. Rottier sued, arguing “that, by bidding on the keyword 
search terms ‘Habush’ and ‘Rottier,’ Cannon & Dunphy used the names for 
advertising purposes without [Mr.] Habush’s and [Mr.] Rottier’s written 





201. Id. ¶ 4. 
202. Habush v. Cannon, No. 09-CV-18149, slip op. at 3 (Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2011). 
203. Habush, 2013 WI App 34 ¶ 5.  
CROY_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2020  1:20 PM 
2019] “LEAVE ME MY NAME!” 663 
995.50 Right of Privacy. 
(1) The right of privacy is recognized in this state.  One whose 
privacy is unreasonably invaded is entitled 
to . . . relief . . . . 
(2) In this section, “invasion of privacy” means any of the 
following: . . . 
(b) The use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of 
trade, of the name, portrait, or picture of any living 
person, without having first obtained the written 
consent of the person . . . .204 
The parties’ arguments primarily centered on the words “unreasonably” and 
“use.”  Cannon & Dunphy argued “that their purchase of the words ‘Habush’ 
and ‘Rottier’ . . . [wa]s not a ‘use’ of [the] plaintiffs’ names.”205  The trial court 
summarized the defendant’s argument: 
[I]t is a violation of the right of publicity only if the plaintiffs’ 
name was used “in or on” the defendant’s product or ad.  Their 
logic is that although a person has a protectable property 
interest in the us of his or her name, it is only the explicit open 
display of the name that constitutes “use.”206 
The trial court disposed of this argument quickly: 
First, the simple, plain English meaning of the word “use” 
certainly includes the purchase of a name to trigger results 
from a computer algorithm.  Second, even if the law required 
the open display of a plaintiff’s name, the search terms 
“Habush” or “Rottier” appear openly in close proximity to the 
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C. link.  
. . . .  
. . . The utilization, employment, application, or 
exploitation of anything for any purpose constitutes “use.”207 
The trial judge then analyzed the reasonability of the use.208  The court 
considered a number of factors:  
(1) “standard and historic methods of competition;”  
(2) “person/firm integration;”  
(3) “user confusion;”  
(4) “internet advertising developments;” and  
 
204. WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2011–12) (emphasis added). 
205. Habush, slip op. at 10.  
206. Id. at 11.  
207. Id.  
208. Id. at 16.  
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(5) “business practices and attorney ethics.”209  
On the first factor, standard and historic methods of competition, the trial 
court was influenced heavily by the business practice of advertising next to, or 
even moving next to, a competitor.210  For example, “A Chevrolet dealership in 
the post-World War II era would open shop on a large lot at the edge of town.  
Within a year or two, a Ford dealership was across the street.”211  Similarly, 
common experience teaches that McDonalds are often across the street from 
Burger Kings.212  The trial court found competitive keyword advertising was 
the modern equivalent of these historical practices.213 
Problematically, the trial court focused on the resulting advertisement as 
opposed the use of the name itself.214  Purchasing a name is different than 
moving next door to competition.  While difficult, an attorney can change 
offices if a strip club moves next door.  However, it seems fundamentally unfair 
and unreasonable to ask the attorney to change his or her name.  Furthermore, 
if an attorney wished to purchase his or her own name as a keyword, it would 
become more expensive because of the other attorney’s bidding.  The trial court 
missed these distinctions by focusing on the advertisement, as opposed to the 
use of the name.  Indeed, Mr. Freedman’s analogy is more on point because it 
focuses on the use of the name.  Recall that he “likened it to putting one’s name 
on another lawyer’s door and labeled it as ‘wrong.’”215 
Next, the trial court considered the “secondary meaning” of the names 
Habush and Rottier.216  It found the names were “inseparable from” a well-
known law firm.217  Therefore, the court concluded searchers did not necessarily 
 
209. Id. at 18–25.  
210. Id. at 18.  In Florida’s most recent debate regarding competitive keyword advertising, one 
attorney made a similar argument.  Email from Mark Gold, Att’y, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, 
Fla. Bar (Oct. 16, 2018) (on file with the Marquette Law Review).  He stated, 
I just have to comment on Mr. Hanna’s alleged “professional injury”.  Mr. 
Hanna has consistently opened offices next door or down the street from my 
offices, and has even copied my slogan “don’t pay that ticket”.  perhaps [sic] we 
should consider a rule that says a lawyer cannot trade on the reputation of 
another by opening an office near another attorney practicing in the same field?  
Id. 
211. Habush, slip op. at 18. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 18–19. 
214. Id. 
215. Combined Reply Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 25 
at 10, app. at 52. 
216. Habush, slip op. at 20. 
217. Id. at 21–22. 
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expect to personally find Habush and Rottier.218  For example, a well-known 
Wisconsin car dealership is named “Russ Darrow” after its owner.219  The court 
rhetorically asked, “If one Googles the term ‘Russ Darrow,’ does that mean she 
expects to have Russ Darrow personally show the new and used cars on the 
dealership lot?”220 
Here again, the court erred, or at least did not consider the complexities of 
this factor.  A customer who Googles “Russ Darrow” might not expect Russ 
Darrow to personally serve him or her when he or she goes to make a purchase.  
However, the customer likely expects someone affiliated with Russ Darrow; 
someone that Russ Darrow has put his name behind.  In law firms, this 
expectation is arguably amplified.  There is a reason law firms are typically 
named after their key partners. 
Next, the court considered “user confusion.”  It placed substantial trust and 
confidence in users “to be skeptical about the first impression they may receive 
from a web page or commercial advertisement.”221  Given the above analysis 
of various surveys, the court erred: users are not as familiar with search result 
page architecture as the court assumed. 
The court then considered “internet advertising developments.”  The court 
worried that finding in favor of Mr. Habush and Mr. Rottier might create a 
slippery slope: Internet search providers are constantly changing their methods 
and courts should stay out of that.222  Somewhat ironically, the fact that search 
providers often make changes is one of the potential reasons for user confusion, 
yet the court did not consider this in its analysis of user confusion.  The court 
acknowledged internet advertising developments was a weak factor.223 
Perhaps most interestingly, the trial court considered “business practices 
and attorney ethics.”  In so considering, the court suggested that what is 
unreasonable for an attorney might be reasonable for a non-attorney.224  
Ultimately, however, the court steered away from weighing in directly on the 
ethics of attorney participation in competitive keyword advertising, but it did 
note: 
The time may come when a legislature, regulatory board, or 
supreme court determines that the conduct at issue in this case 
 
218. Id. at 22. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 22. 
221. Id. at 23. 
222. Id. at 24. 
223. See id. 
224. Id. at 25. 
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is deceptive and misleading and therefore improper.  But no 
such body has yet drawn this conclusion.  Considering the 
analysis in the preceding sections of this decision, the trend 
may be toward increased freedom and reduced regulation or 
restriction.225 
Notably, the first bar to issue a formal ethics opinion, North Carolina, did 
so shortly after the Habush decision and found the use of another attorney’s 
name was unethical.226  The trial court proceeded to balance the factors and 
found for the defendant.227 
Mr. Habush and Mr. Rottier appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  
Initially, the appellate court tried to dodge the question.  It certified the case to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, noting in the certification: 
[T]he issues presented here are novel and likely to have wide-
ranging impact, because the supreme court has not 
interpreted § 995.50 in any context even generally resembling 
this one, and because the legislature has expressly directed 
in § 995.50(3) that the statute be “interpreted in accordance 
with the developing common law of privacy,” presumably 
something the legislature anticipated would ultimately be done 
by the supreme court.228 
The court explained that it would have to “develop” common law by 
deciding the case, which it did not feel comfortable doing.229  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court denied the certification, leaving the court in the unfortunate 
position of having no other choice.230  
The appellate court, which ultimately upheld the trial court’s judgment, 
explained in its opinion that the question of whether competitive keyword 
advertising constituted a “use” was “a close one.”231  Unlike the trial court, 
which concluded that competitive keyword advertising was a use but that it was 
not an unreasonable use, the appellate court held it was not a use.232  The 
appellate court found the analogies to physical location persuasive, stating, 
“[W]e think the strategy used by Cannon & Dunphy here is akin to locating a 
 
225. Id. 
226. N.C. State Bar, supra note 21. 
227. Habush, slip op. at 25–26. 
228. Habush v. Cannon, No. 2011AP1769, 2012 WL 2345137, at *1, petition denied, 2012 WI 
115, 344 Wis. 2d 306, 822 N.W.2d 883. 
229. See id. at *6. 
230. Habush, 2012 WI 115. 
231. Habush v. Cannon, 2013 WI App 34 ¶ 29, 346 Wis. 2d 709, 828 N.W.2d 876. 
232. Id. ¶ 27. 
 
CROY_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2020  1:20 PM 
2019] “LEAVE ME MY NAME!” 667 
new Cannon & Dunphy branch office next to an established Habush Habush & 
Rottier office . . . .”233  It referenced the car dealership analogy from the trial 
court’s opinion.234  The appellate court noted the contrary interpretation, that 
competitive keyword advertising is a “use,” was also reasonable.235 
From this lengthy explanation of the case, it is clear that reliance on this 
single decision for the proposition that attorney participation in competitive 
keyword advertising does not violate publicity rights—let alone ethics rules—
is, at a minimum, overstated.  Both the case itself and its procedural history 
show it was a close call.  Furthermore, the reasoning is at best questionable for 
the reasons explained above. 
Additionally, common law as summarized in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts is much broader than the Wisconsin statute at issue.  The Restatement 
recognizes “Appropriation of Name or Likeness” as a cause of action: “One 
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”236  Comment b 
further provides that the cause of action is not limited to “commercial 
appropriation.”237  The rationale for protection is similar to the “personality 
justification” sometimes used to justify intellectual property—that the creator 
of the intellectual property identifies so much with the property that he or she 
is harmed on a personal, human level, by its misappropriation.238  The 
Restatement explains: 
The interest protected . . . is the interest of the individual in the 
exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it is represented 
by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of 
benefit to him or to others.  Although the protection of his 
personal feelings against mental distress is an important factor 
leading to a recognition of the rule, the right created by it is in 
the nature of a property right, for the exercise of which an 
exclusive license may be given to a third person, which will 
entitle the licensee to maintain an action to protect it.239 
Instead of citing the Restatement, however, scholars and bars have looked 
exclusively to Habush. 
 
233. Id. ¶ 29. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. ¶ 20. 
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
237. Id. cmt. b.  But see id. (“Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to 
commercial uses of the name or likeness.”). 
238. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330 (1988). 
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977). 
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D. A Fundamental Misunderstanding of Professional Responsibilities 
There is another—more fundamental—problem with advocates of 
competitive keyword advertising citing Habush: A violation of civil law is not 
an ipso facto violation of an ethics rule and vice versa.  Mr. Pierce noted, 
Habush was not a disciplinary case, and the court of appeals in 
Wisconsin CANNOT find violations of disciplinary rules, so 
the fact that there was no violation of the right to privacy statute 
does not mean ipso facto that the same behavior does [not] 
violate a disciplinary rule. . . .  I certainly have had the 
experience of lawyers citing Habush for the proposition that 
the practice was just fine, which is not what the case said.240 
For example, Mr. Pierce cites Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Marks (In re 
Marks),241 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation did not need to prove the tort of misrepresentation in order to prove 
a violation of the disciplinary rules.242  In 1996, Donald Koivisto hired Attorney 
Marvin E. Marks to represent him and his daughter after his wife died in a car 
accident.243  Attorney Marks used two contingency fee agreements that both 
stated: 
If for any reason, the Attorney-Client relationship was to be 
terminated prior to settlement, compromise, or judgment, etc., 
without good cause on client’s behalf, the client hereby agrees 
to pay attorney for the value of legal services received by the 
client for attorney on an hourly rate schedule of $100.00 per 
hour plus expenses.  Said fee will be immediately due and 
payable.244 
Mr. Koivisto decided to hire a different attorney.245  Eventually, his 
daughter also terminated Attorney Marks and she hired the same attorney 
representing her father.246  Attorney Marks claimed to insurance adjusters that 
he had a lien on the settlement of claims.247  The Office of Lawyer Regulation 
prosecuted Attorney Marks under Rule 8.4(c) for claiming a lien that did not 
exist.248  Attorney Marks argued, “[H]e may have been wrong about having 
 
240. Email from Timothy Pierce to Skylar Reese Croy, supra note 62 (emphasis added). 
241. Id. (citing In re Marks, 2003 WI 114, 265 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 836 (per curiam)). 
242. 2003 WI 114, ¶ 50. 
243. Id. ¶ 5. 
244. Id. ¶ 6. 
245. Id. ¶ 8. 
246. Id. ¶ 14 
247. Id. ¶ 22. 
248. Id. ¶ 48. 
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such a lien, but that he did not intentionally deceive anyone because he believed 
he was legally justified in asserting the lien claims.”249  The court disagreed.250  
“While [Attorney] Marks may have legitimately maintained a claim for the 
legal services he rendered before the date of his termination, he nonetheless 
represented to the insurers that he was entitled 25 percent of any recovery 
ultimately obtained by the Koivistos.”251  Importantly for this Article, the court 
reasoned: “[I]t is unnecessary to either plead or prove the tort of 
misrepresentation in order to establish by clear and convincing evidence that an 
attorney has violated a rule of professional conduct, proscribing attorney 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”252 
Nor does a violation of an ethics rule give rise to a cause of action.  The 
ABA Model Rule’s Scope states, “Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise 
to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in 
such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”253 
Habush is only relevant to professional responsibilities insofar as its 
reasoning in interpreting the privacy law at-hand is similar to reasoning that 
ought to apply to a disciplinary rule.  However, Habush did not consider, in any 
significant manner, consumer confusion nor did it seriously consider attorney 
advertising regulation more generally.  Indeed, the trial court merely noted 
these concerns in passing.  In summary, even if Habush was decided correctly, 
it cannot serve as a shield in the context of disciplinary proceedings.  Some bars 
have a fundamental misunderstanding of this case. 
E. Other Intellectual Property Rationales 
Whether intellectual property is even the right framework for thinking 
about attorney regulation is questionable.  However, given that scholars and 
bars seem to have intellectual property-related concerns, it is worth 
acknowledging all of the various rationales for intellectual property.  The 
debate has focused, to some extent appropriately, on consumer confusion—a 
trademark rationale.  Some of these other rationales hint at preserving the 
dignity of the legal profession, which is a legitimate secondary interest of bar 
associations.254  These other rationales are: 
 
249. Id. ¶ 47. 
250. Id. ¶ 48. 
251. Id. ¶ 52. 
252. Id. ¶ 50 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schalow, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 388 
N.W.2d 176 (1986)). 
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
254. See the discussion of constitutionality of bar regulation of advertising, infra Section IV.A. 
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(1) personality justification;  
(2) dilution; and  
(3) commercial morality. 
1. “Leave Me My Name!” 
Personality “justification posits that property provides a unique or 
especially suitable mechanism for self-actualization, for personal expression, 
and for dignity and recognition as an individual person.”255  “[I]ts central tenet 
[is] the proposition that, ‘to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—
an individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.”256 
In the United States, personality justifications for intellectual property are 
minimal, but it is the primary rationale in Europe.257  The most common 
example of a law based on personality justifications is artists’ “moral rights.”258  
Artists have the “right to prevent others from, among other things, modifying, 
distorting, or otherwise interfering with the integrity of that work—even after 
the creator alienates both the physical object in which the work is embodied 
and its copyright.”259  In the United States, a weak version of moral rights exists 
in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.260 
It is hard to think of something more personal than a name.261  It seems 
reasonable to say that names hold a special place in all societies.  Indeed, the 
comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts discussed above are essentially 
personality justifications for the tort.262  As Professor Jonathan Kahn argued, 
 
255. Hughes, supra note 238, at 330.  
256. Id. (quoting Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982)). 
257. Id. at 330–31. 




261. See Jonathan Kahn, What’s in a Name? Law’s Identity Under the Tort of Appropriation, 74 
TEMP. L. REV. 263, 267–68 (2001) (quoting ANTHONY COHEN, SELF CONSCIOUSNESS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE ANTHOLOGY OF IDENTITY 72 (1994)) (“Claude Levi-Struss has pointed out that 
‘naming is a mode of classification, and that classification is a necessary precondition to possession.’  
Commenting on Levi Strauss, anthropologist Anthony Cohn further notes that ‘his logic would lead us 
to the conclusion that naming is required for our society to possess a person, that is, to make the person 
a member.’”). 
262. The word “personality” is even a part of the language used to discuss publicity rights.  E.g., 
Manav K. Bhatnagar, Comment, Fantasy Liability: Publicity Law, the First Amendment, and Fantasy 
Sports, 119 YALE L.J. 131, 133 (2009) (citations omitted) (“Courts have consistently held that publicity 
law protects the identity or persona of a player—as expressed through images, likeness, personality, 
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“[A]n appropriation and commodification of identity is considered a blow to a 
person’s dignity, undermining the integrity of his or her self.”263 
For attorneys, names hold a particularly important place—above that even 
of most other citizens.  It is common practice for female attorneys, for example, 
to keep their last names when they marry because their last names have value.264  
For example, the Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School is Margaret 
Raymond and she is married to Professor Mark Sidel.265 
2. Diluting a Name 
Trademark law protects against more than just consumer confusion.  It also 
protects the investment made in a brand.  A famous brand can sue for 
dilution.266  “Trademark dilution occurs when a person or company uses a mark 
identical or substantially similar to a pre-existing trademark, triggering a mental 
association on the part of the consumer between the two marks, thereby eroding 
 
or other symbolic means—and not against ‘mere use of a name.’”); Tyler Hartney, Note, Likeness Used 
as Bait in Catfishing: How Can Hidden Victims of Catfishing Reel in Relief?, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 277, 292 (2018) (2018) (quoting IND. CODE ANN § 32-36-1-6) (“[T]he language is very broad 
in terms of opening the door to claims for any ‘aspect of a personality’s right of publicity,’ and 
personality is defined as any name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive 
appearance, gestures, or mannerisms.”). 
263. Kahn, supra note 261, at 265. 
264. Leigh Ann Humphries, Dr. Maiden Name Will See You Now – Medical Students Give Their 
Last Names A Lot of Thought, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/generalprofessionalissues/49826 
[https://perma.cc/5VGD-NFTE] (“Women who do decide to keep their maiden names are anything but 
maidens.  Many are high-power executives, news anchors, lawyers, artists, or as this article suggests, 
future leading doctors.  Highly educated, high-earning women are disproportionately likely to keep 
their names after marriage.  This may not be surprising.  Long education and competitive work 
environments lead some to marry at older ages, at times when they have established professional and 
personal lives with their maiden names.”).  For a scholarly analysis of brides deciding to keep their 
name, see Richard E. Kopelman, Rita J. Shea Van-Fossen, Eletherios Paraskevas, Leanna Lawter, & 
David J. Prottas, The Bride Is Keeping Her Name: A 35-Year Retrospective Analysis of Trends and 
Correlates, 37 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 687 (2009). 
265. See Margot Slade, Dean Limelight: Margaret Raymond, University of Wisconsin Law, 
LAWDRAGONCAMPUS (Nov. 9, 2014), http://campus.lawdragon.com/dean-limelight-margaret-
raymond-university-of-wisconsin-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/HE59-G4B9 ] (“There are some great 
restaurants here; my husband, Mark Sidel, and I love the Madison Farmers’ Market . . . .”). 
266. Dilution only protects famous marks because dilution is concerned with the “whittling 
away” of the mark and not confusion.  Julie C. Frymark, Note, Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to 
Stop the Infection from Spreading, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 165, 175 n.71 (2003).  Perhaps the fame 
requirement creates a problem for the analogy this Article draws: Should only famous attorneys be 
protected?  This Article, however, does not suggest that a dilution analogy is a primary argument for 
regulation.  It is merely a secondary concern that could edge a bar on the fence toward regulation. 
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the strength of the original mark.”267  The point of dilution causes of action is 
to protect “the goodwill and investment made by business owners . . . .”268  
Generally, courts and legislatures agree that dilution “is necessary to maintain 
a competitive economy . . . .”269 
By analogy, attorneys invest in their names and reputations.  The misuse of 
attorneys’ names arguably discourages attorneys from investing in their 
“brand.”  It does not promote healthy and natural competition, but instead 
allows one attorney to usurp the brand of another.  Indeed, a similar concern 
has partially justified publicity rights: “Recognition of the right also avoids the 
unjust enrichment and depreciation in value of the likeness, which would occur 
if advertisers and others were allowed to trade on the goodwill another has 
created in his name or likeness.”270 
3. Commercial Morality 
Similarly, part of the justification for trade secret law is commercial 
morality.271  Essentially, businesses have to play nicely with each other out of 
a sense of moral obligation.  Indeed, going back to the Restatement (First) of 
Torts, commercial morality has been an aspect of trade secret law.272  “[O]ne of 
the primary tasks of law in a liberal, capitalist democracy is to maintain and 
further the values and characteristics which are crucial to the functioning of 
capitalism.”273  Duties imposed by commercial morality distinguish capitalism 
from economic anarchy. 
In addition to trade secrets, the hot news tort is another kind of commercial 
morality imposed by law.274  No one “owns” a property right in news per se, 
 
267. Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of 
Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1828 (2000). 
268. Id. at 1829. 
269. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1030; S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275)). 
270. Ashley D. Hayes, The Right of Publicity and Protection of Personas: Preemption Not 
Required, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049, 1058 (2001). 
271. See Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. 
WESTERN L. REV. 209, 210 (2006). 
272. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“A complete 
catalogue of improper means is not possible.  In general they are means which fall below the generally 
accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”). 
273. Harry J. Glasbeek, Commercial Morality Through Capitalist Law: Limited Possibilities, 27 
REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 265, 265 (1993). 
274. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237–38 (1918). 
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yet news organizations owe quasi-property duties to other news organizations.  
As two scholars wrote: 
In the only hot news misappropriation case to reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Associated Press (AP) had been granted an 
injunction to keep rival International News Service (INS) from 
taking AP dispatches from the frontlines of World War I, 
rewriting them, and transmitting them as INS articles.  The 
Court upheld the injunction, and in doing so, famously 
declared that AP had a “quasi-property” right in its news 
reports.  This limited right allowed AP to prevent competitors 
from reaping where they had not sown . . . .275 
These arguments stand in contrast with Professor Goldman and Mr. Reye’s 
claim that competitive keyword advertising promotes competition.276  The 
question ought to be what promotes healthy competition: not what promotes 
competition generally.  Lawyers have, or at least should have, duties imposed 
by commercial morality.  They do not own property rights in their names, 
however, they own quasi-property rights they can enforce against other 
attorneys.  Recall South Carolina’s opinion from above.277  Furthermore, the 
Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “A lawyer should 
demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including 
judges, other lawyers and public officials.”278  In order for the legal profession 
to exist in a healthy and competitive capitalistic society, lawyers need to play 
nicely with each other.  Getting into catty fights is a sign of a bad lawyer and 
bars are justified in reacting.  Furthermore, it hurts the public’s perception of 
the profession. 
IV. CRY ME A RIVER, GOOGLE 
Advocates of attorney participation in competitive keyword advertising 
love to cry foul and bring up regulations’ constitutionality.  Google, for 
example, argued against the 2013 Florida Bar’s proposal on constitutional 
grounds: 
[T]he Proposed Advisory Opinion ban[s] all advertising using 
another attorney or law firm’s name as a triggering “keyword,” 
regardless [of] whether that advertisement is inherently false 
or misleading. . . .  [M]any keyword advertisements triggered 
from the name of another attorney or law firm are not 
 
275. Jeffrey L. Harrison & Robyn Shelton, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Hot News: 
Toward a Functional Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1649, 1655 (2013). 
276. Goldman & Reyes, supra note 3, at 113. 
277. See In re Naert, 777 S.E.2d 823 (S.C. 2015) (per curiam). 
278. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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inherently false and misleading, and serve an important 
function in providing consumers legal services with relevant, 
useful, and helpful information about the options available to 
them.  “Because of the value inherent in truthful, relevant 
information, a state may ban only false, deceptive, or 
misleading commercial speech.”  Mason v. Florida Bar, 208 
F.3d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2000). (emphasis added).  Since the 
advertisements banned by the Proposed Advisory Opinion are 
generally not false, deceptive, or misleading, its blanket ban 
may not be adopted.279 
Consumers’ inability to identify advertisements ought to be of considerable 
concern to state bars because it means consumers are being manipulated.  
Confusion as to source and commercial morality are also persuasive. 
This Part first explains the constitutionality of attorney advertising 
regulations.  Next, this Part questions whether the purchase of another’s name 
is even speech within the scope of First Amendment protection.  Lastly, this 
Part notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has not exempted the media from 
publicity rights lawsuits.  States’ interests in regulating attorney participation 
in competitive keyword advertising is at least as great as states’ interest in 
protecting publicity rights. 
A. The Slippery Slope of Attorney Advertising 
At the Founding of the United States, attorney advertising was abnormal.280  
Attorneys were seen as members of a profession, and advertising was not only 
viewed as a threat to the profession’s dignity but also a threat to the public.281  
Advertising was thought to lead to “barratry, champerty, and maintenance.”282  
Advertising, however, rose in the nineteenth century.283  Its rise was more than 
a minor problem.  For example, Figure 6 below is an advertisement from 
1833.284 
 
279. Letter from Terri Chen to Eugene Keith Pettis, supra note 28. 




284. This advertisement is discussed in PEARCE, KNAKE, GREEN, JOY, KIM, MURPHY, & TERRY, 
supra note 43, at 211. 
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Figure 6: Attorney Advertisement from 1833 
 
Notably, the attorneys advertising in Figure 6 had an endorsement from 
none other than Chief Justice John Marshall. 
This is the slippery slope that can become attorney advertising.  
“[T]hroughout the nineteenth century an alarming amount of corruption entered 
the legal profession.  Part of the corruption was believed to originate from the 
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decline of professional regulation that had occurred . . . .”285  The increase in 
corruption led to the ABA’s promulgation of the Professional Canon of Ethics 
in 1908.286  While today many presume that the dignity of the profession is a 
separate policy goal from the protection of the public, the two were seen as 
linked at the turn of the nineteenth century.287  Bars, perhaps, went too far over 
the next several decades with regulating attorney advertising.288  In 1977, the 
U.S. Supreme Court responded in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,289 which held 
that attorney advertising was protected commercial speech,290 perhaps as a 
result of state bars’ over-regulation on attorney advertising.291  While 
supporters of attorney advertising like citing Bates, the opinion itself noted 
several limits, summarized well by a student comment: 
First, although advertising could not be subject to blanket 
suppression, the state had broad power to regulate how an 
attorney may advertise.  Second, false or misleading ads 
remained subject to restraint.  However, the court failed to 
define either false or misleading in the context of attorney 
advertising.  Third, although the Court opened the door to 
various forms of attorney advertisements, the holding was 
limited to advertising routine legal services in the print media.  
Finally, the Court failed to extend the holding to television 
advertising.  Specially, the Court stated, “[T]he special 
problems of advertising on the electronic media will warrant 
special consideration.”292 
 
285. Callender, supra note 44, at 93. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. See id. at 94–95. 
289. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
290. Id. at 383. 
291. In the decade after Bates, many discussed the decision as a reaction to the severely limited 
nature of attorney advertising at that point in history.  See, e.g., Robert F. Boden, Five Years After 
Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 550 (1982) (“The 
prevailing theory, from 1908 to Bates in 1977, was that advertising by lawyers was a form of 
solicitation of legal business, equally to be condemned with ‘ambulance chasing’ and other forms of 
direct or personal solicitation.”); First Amendment – Professional Discipline and the Right to 
Advertise, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 624, 624 (1977) (“The absolute ban on lawyer 
advertisements enforced by the bar since the beginning of this century was held unconstitutional in 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.”). 
292. Callender, supra note 44, at 97 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384); see also Bates, 433 U.S. 
at 383 (“In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, and that 
the advertisement at issue is protected, we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not 
be regulated in any way.”). 
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Under Bates, regulation of competitive keyword advertising is permissible 
for at least three reasons.  First, a ban on competitive keyword advertising is 
not a blanket ban on advertising: It is narrowly tailored.  Specific limits on 
competitive keyword advertising—as opposed to a ban—are even more 
narrowly tailored.  Second, competitive keyword advertising not only harms 
the dignity of the profession, but it also misleads consumers: Indeed, it harms 
the dignity of the profession, in part, because it misleads consumers.  Lastly, 
the internet is analogous to “the special problems of advertising on the 
electronic media” that the Court noted warrant “special consideration.” 
Some supporters of competitive keyword advertising might argue that even 
if the advertisements are misleading, most members of the public are not 
harmed.  They would stress that few searchers would hire the wrong attorney.  
However, this argument relies on an overly narrow definition of harm.  As 
shown above, consumers trust organic results more than advertisements.293  
They also have trouble distinguishing the two.  A keyword advertisement that 
is insufficiently labeled is harmful because it takes advantage of this increased 
trust.  Being misled and manipulated is inherently harmful.  It causes a 
consumer to waste time, and it causes frustration.294  This wasted time and 
frustration is quite similar to initial interest confusion, a well-established 
ground for regulation in trademark law. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held state bars are justified in 
regulating attorneys if an act has “proved to be misleading in practice.”295  This 
Article has laid out substantial empirical proof.  In Florida Bar v. Went for It, 
Inc.,296 the Court also stated that bars have “substantial interest . . . 
in . . . preventing the erosion of the confidence in the profession . . . .”297  This 
is a legitimate secondary concern with respect to competitive keyword 
advertising. 
B. Defining Speech 
Cannon & Dunphy tried to defend itself in Habush by arguing “their use of 
search engine sponsored links [wa]s protected by the First Amendment . . . .”298  
The trial judge quickly dismissed this argument: 
 
293. PRUSSAKOV, supra note 35, at 17. 
294. See Goodstein, Bamossy, Englis, & Hogan, supra note 34, at 743–44. 
295. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982). 
296. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
297. Id. at 635. 
298. Habush v. Cannon, No. 09-CV-18149, slip op. at 5–6 (Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct. June 8, 
2011). 
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This argument fails because the use of a computerized system 
to sequence search results is not speech.  Plaintiffs take no 
issue with the message or content of the text of defendants’ 
sponsored link.  Nor do plaintiffs object to anything on the 
defendants’ website.  This lawsuit involves the hidden process 
which causes the link to appear at all.  That process is content 
neutral.  It is not information; nor is it a message of any sort.  
It is not speech, commercial or otherwise.  Therefore, it is not 
subject of the protection of the First Amendment.299 
The appellate court did not consider this issue on appeal, but the argument 
is straightforward and convincing. 
C. The Media and Publicity Rights 
Google has also assumed that the bars only interest in regulation is the 
protection of the public from false or misleading information.  Yet, the bar may 
have an interest in protecting the integrity of attorneys’ names.  And the 
Supreme Court has held even the news media cannot escape publicity laws.300  
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,301 the Court explained 
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn 
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the 
media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his 
consent. . . . 
. . . “The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is 
the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by 
the theft of good will.  No social purpose is served by having 
the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would 
have market value and for which he would normally pay.”302 
V. CONCLUSION 
As these debates continue to rage, bar associations need to think more 
broadly than they have been.  How does the public use the internet?  What truly 
 
299. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
300. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977). 
301. 433 U.S. 562.   
302. Id. at 574–76 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)); see also Judith Endejan, Comment, The Tort 
of Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Under Wisconsin’s New Privacy Law, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 
1029, 1031 (“Two commentators have concluded, ‘If there is certainty in any area of privacy law, it is 
the area of appropriation.’  Despite this conclusion and despite the removal of substantial first 
amendment considerations from this area, the appropriation tort may be more complicated than is 
initially perceived.”). 
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will protect the public?  Do justifications other than protecting the public have 
any barring on the decision? 
This Article applauds those states that have banned or at least regulated 
attorney participation in competitive keyword advertising.  Those that have not 
have failed to realize consumers’ limited and fragile understanding of search 
engine optimization.  Regulation is necessary not only to protect the public but 
also to preserve the dignity of the profession. 
If a middle ground is necessary, states should require the first line of the 
text of a competitive keyword advertisement state, “ADVERTISEMENT.”  A 
labeling requirement goes to the heart of the underlying problem: Consumers 
have trouble identifying keyword advertisements as advertisements.  The 
problem is amplified in the context of competitive keyword advertising for the 
reasons argued in this Article. 
Search engine providers should not be responsible for ensuring an 
advertisement is sufficiently labeled.  That responsibility should lie with the 
responsible attorney.  Search engine providers do not have an interest in 
sufficiently labeling advertisements, and, furthermore, they are not responsible 
for following ethical rules.  This requirement also curtails the problems caused 
by the changing nature of search result page architecture.  Lastly, even if 
Google and other supporters of competitive keyword advertising are correct in 
arguing a ban creates First Amendment concerns, a mere labeling requirement 
almost certainly does not. 
Admittedly, this Article’s favored solution would be an outright ban.  In the 
future, hopefully bars will at least consider more seriously leaving attorneys 
their names.  For now, however, a labeling requirement will suffice. 
 
